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Abstract 
 
The EU has been engaged in promoting democracy in Egypt for the last two decades. In 
2011, Egyptians took part in huge demonstrations resulting in changes in the Egyptian 
political reality. This study investigates the changes in the European Union democracy 
promotion policy in Egypt after the events of 2011, causes of policy change and policy 
change mechanisms. This study takes a comparative case study approach, juxtaposing 
European Union democracy promotion policies in Egypt at different points of transition. 
The study concludes that there were no major changes in the EU policies but there were 
only some corrections in the current strategy. The study indicates that the change in the 
local situation in Egypt was the main reason behind EU democracy promotion policy 
change. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Democracy as a form of government is argued to be "the only reliable foundation on 
which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built” (Diamond, 1995, 
p.9). International actors promote democracy outside their borders, for reasons like global 
security, economic interests, and domestic gains. In the last decades, democracy promotion 
became a new commodity of international actors’ foreign policy agenda.  
The European Union (EU), as an international actor, faces several challenges that forced 
it to restructure its foreign policy in its geographical neighborhood. The challenges mainly are, 
immigration issues, regional security, energy security and religious extremism (Pearce, 2007). to 
save its security and prosperity from those challenges, EU endorsed democracy promotion policy 
as strategy to engage with the neighborhood (Pearce, 2007). In the last 10 years, the EU used 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as its main instrument for democracy promotion in the 
neighborhood. 
Egypt is the most popular Southern Mediterranean EU neighboring country. Euro med 
Survey places Egypt as a key power in the geopolitical redesign of the Mediterranean (IEMed, 
2013). This drives EU to be engaged in promoting democracy in Egypt for the last two decades 
aim for the long-term goal of having a stable democracy in Egypt.  
In 2011, democratic movements went to a new level and major events happened in the 
political and social climate in Egypt. Egyptians took part in huge demonstrations to call for a 
democratic transition of political power. As a result, longtime president Mubarak had to step 
down.  The following period was characterized by a series of constitutional changes, legislation 
changes, consecutive referendums, and elections in a very rapid and complicated manner.  Later 
in 2013, military intervention results total change in the political climate.  
6 
 
The response of the EU was fast and clear: EU officials and member states 
representatives have voiced support to democratization and offer to help in its process to realize a 
consolidated democracy in Egypt.  However, it is not clear whether EU democracy promotion 
policy has been responsive enough to the rapid changes taking place in the country. 
Several studies investigate the EU policies toward what so called Arab spring during its 
transition periods  (Alcaro & Haubrich-Seco, 2012; Alessandri & Altunişik, 2013a; Asseburg, 
2013; Balfour, 2012a, 2012b; Barber, 2003; Bauer, 2011; Behr, 2013; Bicchi & Voltolini, 2013; 
Boserup & Tassinari, 2012; Byman, 2013; Colombo & Tocci, 2012; Dadush & Dunne, 2011; 
Doherty & Mecellem, 2012; Gugan, 2013; Hanau Santini & Hassan, 2012; Henry, 2012; Hollis, 
2012; Huber, 2013; Khalifa Isaac, 2013; MacKenzie, Kaunert, & Léonard, 2013; Metawe, 2013; 
Perthes, 2011; Wouters & Duquet, 2013). The previous studies address EU polices in general 
toward Arab spring events focusing mainly on the initial EU reactions and institutional changes in 
the European Neighborhood Policy. Only Isaac presented a study that focuses on EU-Egypt 
relations which concluded that the democracy-stability dilemma continue to be the main issue 
that govern that relation (Isaac, 2014), however the study did not include the period that follow 
2013 military intervention toward 2014 presidential elections.  
However, due to the proximity of the events, the studies are limited in addressing the 
successive changes of the EU democracy promotion policy that focuses on Egypt in the period 
between the events of 2011 toward the 2014 Egyptian presidential election. This study addresses 
this gap by an attempt to investigate these policy changes, policy change causality, and policy 
change mechanism during the study period.  
The results of the study examined the role of external actors in promoting democracy in 
countries of interest, as those actors spend considerable time and financial resources to encourage 
countries along their path to democracy. Thus, research is instrumental to ensure that these efforts 
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yield positive contribution to the transition to democracy and they are well understood by targeted 
groups.   
Moreover, the study provides in-depth analysis of the European Union democracy 
promotion policy in Egypt and its changes over the study period in reflection to the local context. 
Such information can shed light on the factors affecting the EU policies and can help clarifying 
the motives, strategies, and action of EU in intervening in democracy matters of Egypt, which is 
necessary for both sides, inside EU to justify the actions and spending, and inside Egypt to justify 
the intervention. Finally, the study seeks to verify the responsiveness of EU policies to the rapid 
changes involved in democratic transitions similar to the case of Egypt. Such an attempt can help 
EU policy maker to assess their responsiveness toward changing political climates in the 
neighborhood. Thus, the findings of this research can be helpful for EU to better design new 
democracy promotion policies not only in Egypt but also in similar situations of transitions to 
democracy. 
Finally, the study concluded that there were no major changes in the EU policies but what 
happened were only some corrections in the current strategy.  Further research should be 
conducted to investigate the policy outcomes and results of those corrections. The analysis 
indicated that the change in the local situation in Egypt was the main reason behind EU 
democracy promotion policy change. That is because; promotion of democracy under an 
authoritarian ruling is different from in the same activity during transition. The change in the 
local context presented threats and opportunities, which forced the EU to undergo policy changes.  
The policy change mechanism can be explained by Cybernetics, where local feedback from 
the policy implementation team and other reviewers contribute as an input for a change in the 
policy. The policy change mechanism can be illustrated in five steps: 1) Recognize and define the 
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local needs, 2) Gathering the necessary information, 3) Policy review, 4) Strategy paper 
development, 5) Integration of the new strategy in the implementation instruments. 
2. Research Question 
 
2011 events might have had some influence on the EU foreign policy. So far, such an 
influence and the extent of change in the EU foreign policy remain vague and unclear. Some EU 
officials argue that EU had undergo  a major foreign policy shift, while policy scholars view EU 
actions as a minor ineffective procedural changes only (Balfour, 2012a; Bauer, 2011; Colombo & 
Tocci, 2012). It is debatable whether the EU policy change was sufficiently effective to capitalize 
on and interact with the current dynamics in Egypt or not. The reasons and mechanism of the EU 
policy change are vague, the influence of the events happening in Egypt on the policy in not 
clear. The study aims at addressing this lack of clarity by providing a clearer view on changes in 
the EU response focusing primarily on the change of EU democracy promotion policy in Egypt as 
a major tool of EU foreign policy. 
The primary focus of the study is to determine the role of the changes in the external 
environment (Egypt local political events) on the European democracy promotion policy. The 
study addresses the questions of how EU foreign policy is influenced by the events in Egypt. To 
achieve that, the study is analyzing EU democracy promotion policy during different stages of the 
transition period, in order to discover the chain that connects a political event, in Egypt, to a 
foreign policy outcome, from EU.  
This focus raises several questions such as; what was the EU democracy promotion 
policy before 2011? What are the EU objectives promotes democracy in Egypt? What changes 
had occurred on these domains (if any) after the events of 2011? Why these changes take place? 
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How did the change happen? How those changes reflected EU new objectives and were it 
effective in meeting them?  
3. Background 
 
The EU democracy promotion history is quite small as the EU itself is a new 
international actor. As indicated in the Treaty on the European Union, EU sees itself as a 
normative actor in global governance. It prioritizes the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
good governance, and rule of law and seeks to develop relations and build partnerships with third 
countries and organizations that share these values (Wouters & Duquet, 2013). 
At 1957, the council established The Treaty of Rome to create the European Economic 
Community. However, the treaty have no conditions that require the presence of democracy as a 
prerequisite of membership in the economic community, the treaty members endorsed the 
Birkelbach Report, which enumerate the EEC’s membership condition. The report stated that 
“Only States which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of our Community” (Whitehead, 1986).  
Such conditionality was used as a roadblock, to prevent nondemocratic countries from 
enjoying the privileges of the ECC and to push for democratic reform in those countries. This 
conditionality constitutes additional pressure over the authoritarian governments for reform. 
Spain, Portugal and Greece were not able to join the economic community until 1970’s, where 
they establish democracy (Mawby, 2008).  
As it proves success, the idea of linking political and economic benefits to democratic 
reform was rooted in the European policies. After the formation of the European Union and the 
fall of Soviet Union, this conditionality was used to guide EU support to former communist 
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countries, thus, democracy was a prerequisite for entrance of the EU. EU was able to use this 
conditionality approach successfully to promote democracy in those countries. On the same time, 
EU helps them along the way of establishing consolidated democracies (Mawby, 2008). It was 
stated that the EU democracy promotion program in eastern Europe is the most successful 
democracy promotion program ever implemented by an international actor (Kubik, Vachudova, 
& Ekiert, 2007). 
In the 1990’s, the EU was facing volatile neighbors on all sides. On one side were the 
struggling eastern European transitions, and on the other side was the unstable Mediterranean 
region. In addition to, the EU failure to exercise significant diplomatic or military power to stop 
Balkans crises, all these factors increase challenges of regional instability, immigration and 
security at European borders. Furthermore, these situations indicated that countries on the borders 
of the EU would become more destabilized as a result of feelings of exclusion. It was argued that 
the remedy of this situation is to promote ‘an arc of well-governed states in the EU’s 
neighborhood’ (Johansson-Nogués, 2004). That pushes EU to craft a new stronger foreign policy 
to promote democracy and stability in the periphery, and redefine a new role for itself as a 
regional and global power (Pearce, 2007).   
Also in the 1990’s, Democracy become the focus of the international community by 
introducing democratization as a part of foreign policy. The reason behind this is that the 
international affairs theory is dominated by security concerns, where countries are primarily 
interested in their own survival, which guide the country’s foreign policy decision-making. Since 
the end of the Cold War the donor countries were progressively more focused on the promotion 
of democracy as a new commodity in international affairs to address global security. This 
approach increased even more after 9/11 with the initialization of the war on terror. Thus, 
democracy was establishment as an international norm that legitimizes regimes and explains 
external efforts to promote democracy. 
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The establishment democracy as an international norm focuses on liberal approach to 
democracy. This undermines the concept of diverse perceptions to the notion of democracy. In 
several cases, local communities view external actors’ democracy promotion actions as external 
culture imposition over the state internal affairs. An example for that is western democracies 
continues to advocate for liberal democracy on the Arab region. However, a study done on the 
Arab countries reported that the substantive approach of democracy is the most appealing 
democracy form in the Arab countries (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012). The results of the study 
suggest that, many people in the Arab region evaluate democratic regimes on the substantive 
outcomes that governments produce, rather than the procedural aspects of how the governments 
operate.  
Moreover, A fresh analysis of the discourses of the Arab spring revolutions indicates the 
use of discourses relate to social justice, human rights, political liberation, and self-determined 
foreign policy (Seigneurie, 2012). This analysis highlight that social and economic rights as well 
as political and civil rights had played an important role in the revolution, extending the demands 
of the Arab spring beyond liberal democracy framework (Huber, 2013). 
These contradictions in understanding the notion of democracy present a challenge in 
designing a democracy promotion policy, especially in the time where the targeted country is in a 
volatile dynamic political situation.  Each international actor designs a different blend of 
democracy promotion tools, to address the targeted country according to its contexts. For 
example, promoting democracy in a fragile state is different from promoting democracy in a 
stable state; also, promoting democracy under authoritarian rule is different from promoting 
democracy in the transition period. Thus, a change in the status of the targeted country from 
authoritarian regime to transition state will entail a policy change in the democracy promotion 
strategy of the international actor.  
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The EU politics in the neighboring countries, before Arab spring, was based on setting up 
normative frameworks for gradual economic and legislative adaptation, without challenging the 
nature of the regime which cooperate with EU (Balfour, 2012a). The EU politics at that time was 
characterized by a dilemma between the EU’s stability and democratization goals (Cavatorta & 
Pace, 2010), with a gap between the creation of frameworks and initiatives and their non-
implementation, by delegating political actions to individual countries’ bilateral relations 
(Balfour, 2012a). This was the reason behind the reluctant EU position on the first days of the 
uprising (Bauer, 2013; Wouters & Duquet, 2013) 
Soon after the first weeks of the Arab spring, the EU decidedly joined and supported the 
decision of the Arab people (Bauer, 2013; Wouters & Duquet, 2013), and realized that its current 
policies were incompatible with the newly formed political reality. Consequently, EU decided to 
rethink of a new set of relations with its Southern neighbors based on new principles, 
assumptions, and objectives (Balfour, 2012a; Wouters & Duquet, 2013). Thus, EU changed its 
regional policy by introducing a three-fold response, emphasizing ‘deep democracy’, economic 
development and renewed people-to-people contacts, with the aim of ‘sustainable stability’ as the 
new central idea on the Neighborhood policies (Bauer, 2013), instead of the former short-termism 
(Wouters & Duquet, 2013). 
This policy change is argued to be not a major change in EU policies but it was only a 
correction in the current strategy (Bauer, 2013), and moreover, the polices were practically 
implemented (Balfour, 2012a). Conditionality was hindered, as always, by problems of double 
standards, credibility, impact, and differential treatment of partners (Balfour, 2012a). The 
conditionality concept was weakened more by the silent diplomatic attitude  of the European 
officials on human rights violations and violent actions of the transition governments in 
neighboring countries, such diplomatic attitude was used in a pragmatic way to voice a pre-Arab 
Spring political position (Balfour, 2012a).  
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The weak conditionality concept highlight the inability of the EU to put forward 
conditions of leverage, attractions, incentives and relevance to be able to perform effective 
conditionality in a proactive way, rather than the reactive attitude which was exercised toward 
Arab spring countries (Balfour, 2012a), which impaired ability of EU to support human rights and 
democracy. It is argued that EU must redefine its conditionality policies with ethical bases for 
engagement (Balfour, 2012a), away from the traditional contradictions in supporting dictators and 
advocating for human rights in the same time.  
The old set of policies and relations seems not to be effective any more with the current 
dynamics and leadership in Egypt. Although that may seem as a bleak environment for EU 
cooperation with Egypt, it is actually, in my opinion, an opportunity to reestablish a stronger 
relationship that focuses on mutual interest and the promotion of good practices in all sectors that 
clearly require reform.  
4. Preview of Findings and Recommendations 
 
I found that the European democracy promotion policy in Egypt has changed in response 
to 2011 event. The change was not in the overall strategy but was in the weighted average of 
different programs used to implement the same strategy, which can be labeled as “same cocktail, 
different portions”. From the level of information EU official possess, it is clear that the EU 
cognitive process needs more effort to give policy makers a full informative perspective for 
formulating the policy decision. Policy makers need more information that is why more European 
delegations was sent and more dialogues with Egyptian political actors was performed.  
The causes of change can be explained by the interactive nature of the EU policy toward 
neighboring countries. This interactive nature indicates shared responsibility between the 
Egyptian government and the EU on the policy outcomes. While the Egyptian government was 
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continuously changing during the study period, its priorities and argumentation were also 
changing and in turn affect the EU interventions and change the EU policy. Another aspect of 
interactivity is the EU response to the opportunity highlighted by mass mobilization for 
democracy and the prospect stability of Egypt, which pushed EU to invest more in promoting 
democracy and directly announce its demands for establishing deep democracy in Egypt unlike 
before where democracy promotion was a minor aspect of Egypt-EU relation. 
The mechanism of EU policy change is embedded in the EU policy process. EU policy in 
Egypt, as a neighboring country, is guided by the Association Agreement, and conduct through an 
action plan that is subjected to annual progress report.  The progress report recommendations are 
the base of updating the action plan for the coming year. Thus, EU uses annual progress reports 
and other policy evaluation instruments like the European Court of Auditors (ECA) feedbacks to 
change the policy in Egypt.  
However, the change that occur in the EU policy toward Egypt, it seems that the change 
was not sufficient to cope with the current dynamics that take place in the country. It is 
recommended that EU improve its leverage with Egypt in order to be able to support human 
rights and democracy. To improve the EU leverage with the current leadership in Egypt, diverse 
area of cooperation must be involved. This can be addressed under three main issues; security 
cooperation against terror, economic development, and direct relation with people. This 
highlights the EU need to undergo a major policy change in order to achieve the desired 
democracy, prosperity, and stability in Egypt and protecting EU interests in the region. 
5. Client Description 
 
The research client is “The Delegation of the European Commission to Egypt”.  EU 
delegation in Egypt is the diplomatic mission complementary to EU Member States’ Embassies 
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and reflects the distribution of competences and functions between the EU Member States and the 
European Commission. It works to promote EU interests and values in Egypt, and it is in the front 
line in delivering EU external relations policy and actions, from the common foreign and security 
policy through trade and development co-operation to scientific and technical relations. The 
Delegation of the European Commission to Egypt was officially opened in 1978.  
The Delegation deals with the broad political and economic agenda between the EU and 
Egypt, and plays a role in the implementation and monitoring of the European Neighborhood 
Action Plan with Egypt. It interacts with the government ministries, civil society, and non-
governmental organizations; it reports to Brussels on developments in Egypt. The delegation 
focus is the management of the projects under the different development co-operation programs 
concerning Egypt. 
This research is important to the EU delegation in Egypt, as EU spends considerable time 
and financial resources to encourage Egypt along its path to democracy. Thus, research is 
instrumental to ensure that these efforts yield positive contribution to the transition to democracy 
and they are well understood by targeted groups.  The study provides the delegation with in-depth 
analysis of the European Union democracy promotion policy in Egypt and its changes over the 
study period in reflection to the local context. Such information can shed light on the factors 
affecting the EU policies and can help clarifying the motives, strategies, and action of EU in 
intervening in democracy matters of Egypt, which is necessary for both sides, inside EU to justify 
the actions and spending, and inside Egypt to justify the intervention.  
The findings of this research can be helpful for the EU delegation to design better 
democracy promotion policies not only in Egypt but also in similar situations of transitions to 
democracy. Finally, the study seeks to verify the responsiveness of EU policies to the rapid 
changes involved in democratic transitions similar to the case of Egypt. Such an attempt can help 
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the EU policy maker to assess their responsiveness toward changing political climates in the 
neighborhood.  
6. Literature Review 
 
The term “policy” refers to the course of actions planned or performed by an organization 
or individual (Pearsall, 1999). Although, it refers to the actions of governments, government 
institutions and government officials (Beasley, Kaarbo, & Lantis, 2012). In the perspective of this 
study, these definitions are useful as it opens the policy process to more actors other than the 
state. The policy includes several elements: preferences, targets, and instruments (Tomlinson, 
2013).  These three elements are not permanently fixed as they are affected by external and 
domestic factors leading to policy change. The determination of policy change, its causality, and 
its mechanism is the purpose of this study. 
Foreign Policy is “a guide to actions taken beyond the boundaries of the state to further 
the goals of the state” (B. Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2005). From a less state-centric view, a 
second definition of foreign policy is “a collective coping with the international environment” 
(Hill, 2003, p.239). The later definition of foreign policy enables the inclusion of activities other 
than those conducted by diplomats and foreign ministries.  
6.1. International relation theories and foreign policy analysis 
 
Three international relation theories have contributed to the development of foreign 
policy analysis, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and social constructivism (Keukeleire & Schunz, 
2008). However, social constructivism is not considered a classical international relation theory, 
but it informed the foreign policy analysis recently.  
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From a neo-realist perspective, foreign policy is strongly determined by the external 
environment in an international system characterized by anarchy. In such a system, actors are 
unitary rational actors who interact to assure their security (Jervis, 1977). Each actor’s foreign 
policy actions are proportional to the actor’s relative power in the international system. The actors 
power depends on their material resources like military capacities and raw materials 
(Mearsheimer, 2013). However, in neo-realism a little attention was paid to the domestic context 
and its influence of foreign policy decisions. 
From a neo-liberal perspective, foreign policy is determined by interstate interaction. The 
interaction may imply creation of institution (Keohane, 1989) or interstate cooperation under 
anarchy (Oye, 1985), which is driven by the well of each state to maximize its own interest in the 
international arena. The interstate interaction involves bargaining, based on predefined objectives 
for each state (Keohane, 1989). Each state objective is formulated in the domestic context through 
a process of competition of interests of multiple domestic actors. 
From a social constructivism perspective, foreign policy is determined by the semi-
autonomous exercise of agency, through interaction based on a structure of values and norms 
where by agency and structure codetermine each other. The interaction first create the structure of 
values and norms which set a logic of appropriateness that will guide the actors behaviors across 
the process (March & Olsen, 1998). The constructivism perspective combine both internal and 
international factors in analyzing foreign policy (Carlsnaes, 2002), also it highlights the role of 
ideation factors like values and norms in shaping foreign policy (Adler, 2002).EU foreign policy 
will be best analyzed by the use of social constructivist approach for several reason discussed 
later in this section. 
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6.2. European foreign policy analysis 
 
Using foreign policy analysis traditional models is useful in the analysis of the states’ 
foreign policy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999), but the analysis of the European Union’s foreign 
policy using them will be limited (Lister, 1997).  
The challenges facing European foreign policy analysis by the traditional models can be 
illustrated as follows: first, the traditional models are state centric while European Union is a 
unique type of institutions (Lister, 1997) with a complex institutional setup (Tomic, 2013), thus it 
cannot be defined, structured, or act as a state.  
Second, the traditional models ignored the role of international system in shaping foreign 
policy (Brown, 1997), whereby it cannot give a full picture on the influence of changes in the 
structure of the international system on the policy.  
Third, the traditional models represent a simplified view of policy process (White, 1999), 
however in reality the European policy formulation process is complicated as it identify diverse 
agents for each foreign policy segment and it translate the interaction of their interests through the 
EU institutions (Tomic, 2013).  
Fourth, the traditional models represent a narrow definition of foreign policy. The 
European Union policy is defined as a product that member states control through an 
intergovernmental process. However, intergovernmentalism implies that states remain 
autonomous and sovereign while pursuing their interests (Hill & Wallase, 2013). The nature of 
the European union foreign policy process shows that member states are trapped in the complex 
networks, institutions and procedures at the union level (Edwards, 1996). Thus, both the member 
states autonomy and sovereignty are limited. This in turn limits the ability of the traditional 
models to project an accurate picture of the policy analysis.  
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Finally, traditional models focus on policymaking but ignore the factors behind policy 
initiation. This is important because of the reflective nature of foreign policy (White, 1999). Thus, 
they ignore the effect of political context in the third country and its reflection on the foreign 
policy of an international actor like EU, so they are limited to give meaningful understanding to 
the change in the European foreign policy after the events of 2011, which is the purpose of this 
study. 
6.3.  Combined structure-agency oriented analytical model 
 
To overcome the challenges facing European foreign policy analysis, this study adopts a 
social constructivism analytical approach, by using a combined structure-agency oriented 
analytical model... The model based on both the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis 
(Tian & Dijk, 2011) and the fourth new institutionalism, discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 
2008).  
The elements of the analytical model are: actors, process, issues, instruments, context and 
outputs (White, 1999). The model is designed to answer the following questions: who influence 
the European foreign policy, in what process, on what issues, by which instruments, in which 
context and to achieve what output? 
The combined structure-agency model sums the capacities of both structural and agency 
oriented analytical models. Tomic encouraged that a combination of these two approaches in the 
EU foreign policy analysis (Tomic, 2013). The model combine both structuralist and 
constructivist assumptions as well as discursive agency-oriented approach (Tomic, 2013). The 
model assume that discourse constitute an important part of the structure of foreign policy at the 
macro-social level, Also The political discourse analysis gives a highly relevant insightful actor 
centric perspective about foreign policy (Larsen, 2013).  
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The structure-oriented portion of the model focuses on the macro-level of analysis where 
EU is viewed as a part of the larger structure of the world. This portion is concerned with events, 
developments and the overall impact on EU foreign policy from a macro-level of analysis. 
(Tomic, 2013). 
The agency-oriented portion of the model focuses on the micro level of analysis where 
agency plays an important role in explaining different actors, institutions and their interactions. 
This portion is concerned with the processes leading up to the outcomes of EU foreign policy 
(Tomic, 2013).  
This model is useful to offer an in-depth analysis of a particular case study in European 
foreign policy decision making because; first, the model focuses  on major turning points that 
change the policy rather than the routine decision making process only (White, 1999). Second, 
the chosen model can be used to compare policy making across a range of time (White, 1999), 
which is the core of this study. Third, the chosen model gives particular relation between events, 
knowledge, ideas and process as it tracks how events influence knowledge and creates ideas that 
is translated into policy proposals and move forward to policy actions (White, 1999). Fourth, the 
chosen model enable a wider definition of European Union foreign policy as external actions 
which include the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its security dimension, the 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, foreign trade, international aid and development 
policy as well as asylum policy and immigration from third world countries (Tomic, 2013). Fifth, 
the chosen model expand the policy actors and include multi-level agents like working parties, 
committees and agencies on the EU level (Tomic, 2013), beside the classical agents present in the 
foreign policy analysis. 
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6.4. The role of external environment in changing foreign policy 
 
Foreign policy decision process begins with a threat or opportunity that motivates the 
actions (Charles, 1990) and in most cases foreign policy is seen as a reaction to external event 
(Chapman & Sheehan, 1999). Charles noted that, the change in foreign policy is subjected to four 
agents: political leaders, bureaucratic agents, domestic restructuring and external shocks (Charles, 
1990). Change in the policy occur when policymakers recognize that the current policy is 
ineffective or counterproductive in addressing the threat or the opportunity,  also change in the 
policy can occur when the policy makers realize that the policy implementation cost more than 
expected (Charles, 1990). When this situation happens, policymakers undergo what so called 
“self-corrective changes” to foreign policy. 
The self-corrective changes in foreign policy can be categorized into four gradual levels 
(Charles, 1990), first, Adjustment changes which refer to quantitative changes in the level of the 
performed efforts either by increase or decrease the same efforts, also refinement of targeted 
groups is considered an adjustment change in foreign policy (Charles, 1990). Second, Program 
changes which refer to qualitative changes made in the methods of implementing foreign policy 
decisions like selecting diplomacy solutions over military action in a particular case (Charles, 
1990). Third, Problem/Goals change which refer to changes in the initial goal or problem that the 
foreign policy addresses which entail a change in the foreign policy purpose (Charles, 1990). 
Fourth, international orientation change which refer to a total redirection of actor’s orientation 
toward world affairs, it include a shift of the actor’s role and activities with a major effect on 
several foreign policies (Charles, 1990).  
Cybernetics approach provide an explanation of the change in foreign policy due to the 
effect of external events (Deutsch, 1966). This approach assumes that actors, in their attempt to 
achieve their goals, they continuously monitor the external environment in which the foreign 
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policy is implemented. Actors collect information from the external environment to help them 
determine their situation from their goals and its change across time and events. Actors use such 
feedback to perform incremental self-corrective actions to get closer to their goals. Negative 
feedback or potential failure schemes are the most influential elements that cause change in the 
foreign policy.  
Charles assumes that most foreign policy changes are a result of changes in governments 
perception to external environment which act as a stimulus that induces a political leader 
initiative or a bureaucratic action to develop a new policy or change an existing one (Charles, 
1990).  The magnitude of the effect of the external environment stimuli depends on several 
factors: first, actors’ perception about their ability to capitalize successfully on the threat or the 
opportunity posed by the external environment stimuli to achieve their goals. Second, the conflict 
of interest between those how monitor the external environment and the effect of the new stimuli. 
Third, the relation between the changing policy and other major policy areas. Fourth, the amount 
of resources used to implement the existing policy. Fifth, if the stimuli include a major crisis 
(Charles, 1990). 
The influence of change in the external environment on the foreign policy is a measurable 
fact. As foreign aid is a smaller model of foreign policy, a change in foreign aid indicates a 
change in foreign policy. In a study of donor countries aid policies, Linebarger noted that changes 
in an aid recipient’s governmental structures will produce positive changes in the aid policies 
(Linebarger, 2008). Linebarger reported an increase in aid for countries undergoing transition to 
democracy and for newly formed democracies. This was potentiated by the efforts of donor 
countries to consider democracy in their bilateral aid decisions. This study prove the fact that a 
change in external environment will lead to a foreign policy change especially in the cases of 
transition to democracy like the Egyptian cases under study. 
23 
 
The influence of contextual events in the external environment on foreign policy can be 
recognized in the case of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP, to a great extent, 
is instructed by the European Commission. The policy making of European Commission is 
problem solving in nature, with the organizational tools developed in the integration process 
(Kelley, 2006). This policy making process is characterized by incremental processes of 
adaptation and policy learning (Kelley, 2006), which are strongly influenced by the context in the 
neighboring country (Bauer, 2013). This applies the Cybernetics concepts mentioned earlier. 
Bauer assumed that the impact of the ENP depends crucially on the interaction between the EU 
and the Egyptian system (Bauer, 2013). Thus, changes in the Egyptian system will be reflected on 
the ENP and its impact. For example, a change in the priorities of the Egyptian government will 
require EU to adjust cooperation plans to cope with the new priorities. Bauer added one important 
factor is that, alter Arab spring events, the neighboring countries administrative environment is 
assumed to be more open for democratic reform agendas. This will create a friendly environment 
where the ENP can operate in better conditions achieving more impact. 
7. Methodology 
 
7.1. The research method 
 
The study analyzes the complex policy process of the European foreign policy and its 
relation to events. In such a complex process analysis, the data gathering and analysis can be 
difficult to project the real world if it was built on theoretical set of rules only (Thies, 2002). 
Therefore, the study applied a qualitative historical analysis, which is widely used in the field of 
international relation studies. Qualitative historical analysis refers to a research methodological 
approach that uses historical primary and secondary data sources to analyze the qualities and 
attributes of a certain phenomenon by using words to describe the concepts rather than numbers 
24 
 
(Thies, 2002). This approach was believed to provide the required explanatory description that 
brings holistic understanding to the study subject. 
The study used ‘case study’ research strategy, which is equipped with an extensive 
analysis. The term ‘Case’ refers to a single instance of an event or phenomenon (Odell, 2001), the 
case study strategy is comprehensive and entails detailed contact with  instances of the events and 
behaviors. Throughout this study, the EU democracy promotion policy toward Egypt in four 
different transition periods was compared. The reason to do this is that, the comparison between 
similar but different instances adds analytical leverage to the case study strength (Odell, 2001), 
and it allowed the study to figure out the effect of the change in external environment on the 
policy. The comparison during the study was context-oriented since the events happening in the 
external environment were the unit of analysis.  
Case study strategy was selected for this study for several reasons (Odell, 2001): first, it 
provides a richer empirical analysis based on evidence and reasoning which highlight an accurate 
description and explanation of both the process and the context. Second, it provides empirical 
grounding for causal inference and builds confidence in validating hypothesis. Third, it can trace 
changes in structures and institutions, which is the core on the study. Fourth, it stimulates fresh 
concepts, typologies and hypothesis that helps generalize the finding of the study. Moreover, it 
helps the generation of new theories and the refinement of old ones. 
The case study builds on in-depth key informant interviews with a variety of European 
Union policy stockholders to voice their perspectives on the changes of the European Union 
democracy promotion policy toward Egypt. Also, The case study builds on qualitative content 
analysis of secondary sources such as EU documents in the form of bilateral agreements, reports, 
diplomatic statements, strategic papers, cooperation projects, action plans issued by the European 
25 
 
Union covering the study subject in the study periods. Furthermore, the case study was built on 
several studies of the European response to Arab spring and EU Egypt relation. 
7.2. The model adaptation 
 
For the purpose of this study, the six elements of the combined structure-agency 
analytical model were adapted as follows: first, the Actors, which refers to policy stakeholders on 
multiple levels and on both the European and Egyptian sides. On the European side, the actors 
can be on the union level or on the state level. The actors of the union level are the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, European delegation in Egypt, 
the European External Action Services, Euro-parties, advisory groups associated with them and 
NGOs working on the European level (this include think tanks and research centers). The actors 
of the European member states level are foreign ministries, embassies, NGOs working on the 
state level (include consultancy firm and research center on that level). On the Egyptian side, the 
actors are the foreign ministry, the foreign cooperation ministry, ministry of defense, presidential 
councilors, supreme election commissions, political parties, activists, and local NGOs. 
Second the process, which refers to both foreign policy decision-making process and 
foreign policy implementation process. First, the foreign policy decision making process 
demonstrates the steps of foreign policy preparation in the internal sphere of the European side 
(Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008). It includes two processes the cognitive process and the discursive 
process (Tomic, 2013).. The second part of the foreign policy process is the implementation 
which refers to the activities and actions taken in the target country to achieve the policy goals 
(Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008). In addition, the implementation process includes the monitoring, 
evaluation and reassessment plans for the implemented policy. In this part of the process both 
actors and external environment confront and influence each other (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008), 
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the study of the effect of the change in the external environment and its effect on foreign policy is 
one of the core component of this study. 
Third, the issues, which refers to EU democracy promotion policy in Egypt. The 
democracy promotion policy is investigated on several aspects including: the EU vision for 
democracy in Egypt, the purpose of the policy and its objectives, the reasons behind endorsing 
such a democracy promotion policy, approaches used to promote democracy, type of democracy 
promoted and the values associated with democracy promotion programs. 
Fourth, the instruments, which refers to the policy tools uses by the EU to implement the 
democracy promotion strategy. Those tools are listed in the EU Strategic Framework on Human 
Rights and Democracy. Some examples of these tools are European Instrument for Democracy 
and  Human Rights (EIDHR), European Endowment for Democracy (EED), European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Instrument for Stability (IFS), Development 
Cooperation Instrument, European Development Fund (EDF) and CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) Budget.  
Fifth, the context, which refers to the description of the external environment (Egyptian 
local conditions) and the events happening in the external environment. In the scope of the study 
the local Egyptian conditions were investigated according to the status of democratization in 
multiple periods of the study and the problems facing the progress toward establishing democracy 
in each context. The context also addresses the influence of the Egyptian local events on the 
European Egyptian relation in the perspective of democracy promotion policy. This element also 
included the diverse actor responses to the events. For the study purpose, the events happening in 
the external environment is divided into four time periods: first period, the period between the 
ENP initialization and January 2011 events i.e. from 2004 to January 2011, this period was 
labeled Mubarak time. The second period was from January 2011 events toward the 2012 
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presidential elections; this period was labeled Supreme council for Armed forces (SCAF) time. 
The third period was from 2012 presidential elections toward June 2013 events (the outset of 
president Morsi), this period is labeled Morsi time. The fourth period was from June 2013 toward 
the presidential election 2014; this period was labeled After Morsi time. The European 
democracy promotion policy was compared across the four context periods of the study using the 
elements of the analytical model. 
Sixth, the outputs/outcome, which refers to the policy outcome of the policy process, 
strategies, activities, and actions. This element detail the strategies used to achieve the policy 
objectives like external incentives or conditionality. Also this element cover the activities of 
diplomacy, bilateral relations and democracy aid projects. The diplomacy part is covered through 
the statements of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy. The 
ENP strategy papers, action plans, and progress reports cover the bilateral relation part. The 
democracy aid projects part is covered by the reports issued by the instruments implementing the 
policy like EIDHR report. 
7.3. The analysis plan 
 
To achieve its aim, the study utilized the analytical model and the research methods to 
measure the items listed below: 
• Identify the major events that affect the policy during each period. Identify how 
those events affect the policy. Identify the policy response to each event. Record 
the change in the response to similar events across periods of the study. Collect 
the policy responses to events of each period together to figure the policy 
change for this particular period.   
• Identify key actors for each period, their preferences, and their influence. 
Record the introduction of new actor in certain period or the removal of old one 
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in other period. Record a change in certain actor preferences or degree of 
influence.  
• Identify the steps of the policy process for each period. Record changes 
happened in each step across the time period if the study. 
• Identify the policy issues of each step: identify the policy vision, its purpose, its 
objectives, reasons behind it and approaches used to implement it. Record 
changes of these parameters across period of the study. Identify the type of 
democracy that European policy is aiming to promote. Identify the values 
associated by the wished for democracy. Record changes in both the features 
and values of the promoted democracy. 
• Identify the instruments used to implement the policy, their role, their amount of 
financial support. Record changes of these parameters across periods of the 
study. 
• Identify the policy outcome, its implementation strategies, its activities, and its 
actions. Record the changes of them across the period of the study.   
The study uses an inductive qualitative content analysis approach for both the interviews 
data and the documents content. Qualitative content analysis is used to organize raw data into 
categories or themes based on inference and interpretation for a deeper meaning of texts and 
better understanding of the research topic (Forman & Damschroder, 2008). Using an inductive 
approach, the study did not employ previously prepared coding schemes but it constructed the 
coding categories from the data (Mayring, 2000). This inductive approach for categories 
development is used due to the limited presence of similar studies using the same method, also it 
was used to avoid restriction of the analysis by theoretical constrains that can limit the ability of 
the analysis to capture real world view from both the interviews and the documents.  
29 
 
Using such an approach was confronted with the challenge of the possibly of missing key 
categories which may question the validity of the finding of the study (Lincoln, 1985). To 
overcome this challenge, the study undergo triangulation by performing two actions to achieve 
credible and valid categories coding scheme (Lincoln, 1985): first, the study uses the combined 
structure-agency oriented model as a primary categories reference guide. Second, the study 
undergoes a pilot research to assess the ability of the model and research method to capture real 
worldview and to validate and furthermore develop the primary categories guide. 
The research endorses an inductive constructivist approach where analysis concepts and 
items are driven from the data, thus both the interview guide and the coding scheme was fixable 
to changes according to data gathered from the interviews and the documents being analysis. 
The steps of applying the analysis start by formulating the questions of the interviews to 
be more open ended and encouraging for more free and deep participant comments with probing 
questions. The second step, conducting the interviews, was collecting and organizing the data in 
groups in reference to each time period of the study. The data collection was for electronic 
documents and it was stored in a password-protected computer that only the researcher has access 
to it. Third step was repetitive reading of the data in each group to get the whole data perspective 
(Tesch, 2013). Fourth step was reading the data word by word to determine the coding categories 
that refers to the items that the study attempt to measure (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Fifth step 
was using the content analysis software “NVIVO” to record notes and highlight the presence of 
key words in the data. As the analysis continue the key words was stored in the coding categories 
driven previously from the data to form meaningful clusters (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). The 
sixth step was the definition of the coding categories and linking them to each other according to 
relations between them based on the analytical model discusses earlier. NVIVO software is used 
to store, organize, categorize, code, combine the data of the interviews and the documents to be 
ready for analysis. The analysis was conducted manually after the organizing process and the data 
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is coded in categories by the software. The software also help in building a body of evidence to 
support the case by facilitating the documentation of evidence and their relation to issues. Finally, 
the meaning and the relations between coding categories was illustrated in the analysis report in 
reflection to the model and the items to be measured by the study. 
The result of the study is affected by the a substantial role of the researcher, through 
being the data collection instrument (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998), and personally involved in every 
step of the research process. The researcher perceptions as an Egyptian policy advisor for 10 
years affected each step of the research. However, this helped to facilitate access to data, as the 
researcher was a part of the European Union Visitor Program 2012, United Nation Alliance of 
Civilizations (UNAOC) fellow 2013, and policy advisor to human rights committee in the 
Egyptian parliament 2012. On the other hand, the researcher since 2006 is working as program 
director to an Egyptian NGOs that implement democracy promotion activities supported by 
European countries, which grant the researcher hands on experience with policy implementation 
and direct contact to key informant actors. To avoid the biasness, the study was carefully utilizing 
the model and the data to guide the process. 
8. Data Collection and management  
 
The data collected for the purpose of the study can be classified to primary and secondary 
data. Primary data was in the form of Key informant interviews. The secondary data was in the 
form of EU official documents. The studies also used relevant researches in the form of papers 
and dissertations related to the area of the study. 
Key informant interviews are in-depth interviews with people who have detailed 
information about the research topic. The purpose of key informant interviews is to collect 
information from a diverse wide range of people who have firsthand knowledge about the 
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research topic. These people, with their diverse knowledge and understanding, can provide full 
insight on the nature of problems and give recommendations for solutions. The selection of 
interview participant was done based on representing major EU organizations as main policy 
makers by key experts who belong to those organizations. EU organizations under study are 
detailed in the actors’ description part of the model adaptation subsection. 
The key informant interviews were conducted for the target participants in Cairo and 
Brussels. Eight Cairo interviews were carried out in the period from May 2014 to August 2014. 
Four Brussels interviews were carried out in the period in September 2014. The interviews were 
carried out using the interview guide present in the Appendix. Written notes was takes during 
each interview, then typed in the same day on the researchers personal computer. 
EU official document was EU strategy papers, Action plans, progress reports, European 
parliament resolutions, and press releases. The selection of the text to be analyzed was done 
based on the communication mechanisms between actors that detail the policy outcome and 
report the performance of the policy. Each set of communication documents was grouped 
according to its relation to the study periods. The documents and the study periods are detailed in 
the model adaptation. 
Those documents were collected from the official EU portal (www. europa.eu) and from 
the European External Action Services website (eeas.europa.eu). The criteria of document 
selection were either the document is one of the foundations of the ENP or the document is 
directly specific to Egypt. The specificity to Egypt was determined by the presence of the word 
“Egypt” in the document title. The document used in the study was 5 strategy papers, 1 action 
plan, 6 progress reports, and 170 press releases.  
The data from documents and typed notes of the interviews were organized for analysis 
in NVIVO 7 software. Each document was stored and classified according to its type, publishing 
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authority, period, and date. A primary coding scheme was applied using the analytical model 
elements. More coding categories were generated during reading the documents. Quires with 
relevant coding structures were created to facilitate analysis.  
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1. Democracy: Theoretical Framework 
 
This section will briefly illustrate the theoretical frameworks that explain the general 
reasons behind democracy promotion by international actors, namely: Realism, Liberalism, and 
the Democratic Peace Theory. The later sections will highlight the challenges facing the EU in its 
neighborhood, which induce the EU to promote democracy in the region. The analysis will move 
forward to discuss the importance of Egypt to the EU. Furthermore, the analysis will discuss the 
relation between the regional challenges faced by the EU, and the EU’s policy of democracy 
promotion in Egypt. Finally, the analysis will use the theoretical model to explain the changes in 
the policy after 2011 and identify the causes of the change and its mechanism. The papers will 
conclude by illustrating the criticism facing the EU policy and put forward recommendations to 
further develop the EU policy. 
The reasons to promote democracy abroad can be related to the believe that democracy is 
the best form of governance, it protects human rights and prevents genocide, it facilitates 
economic growth, and it aids the cause of peace (Art, 2003). Such goals are important to 
international actors and worth investment, to establish global security and prosperity. 
Theoretically, Realism and Liberalism are two approaches to explain the reasons behind 
including democracy promotion as a part of the foreign policy agenda of an international actor.  
Realism indicates that actors in foreign policy are self-interested where actors’ actions are 
guided by the cost-benefit analysis (Powley, 2012). Therefore, realists believe that actors will 
promote democracy when democracy is in their best interest, as normally there is no duty to 
promote democracy.   
Liberalism indicates that actors have a duty to use policies that develop liberty and 
prosperity for all people, including those outside of their own borders. As David Forsythe 
highlighted that international actors interests and human freedom are interlinked which makes 
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democracy, just like freedom, a universal interest (Forsythe, 2000). For the reason that democracy 
is a universal value and a way to achieve liberty and prosperity, liberals believe that actors will 
promote democracy to perform their duty of achieving liberty and prosperity to all people.  
Internationally, Democracy promotion is acknowledged as peace creator (Kant, 1939). 
The relation between peace and democracy can be understood through ‘The Democratic Peace 
Theory’ (Kant, 1939). Two centuries ago, in his essay “Perpetual peace” Kant was the first to 
propose ‘The Democratic Peace Theory’ and he noted that there is a positive correlation between 
democracy and peace (Kant, 1939). The theory claims that democratic states do not wage war 
upon one another. Therefore, it is possible to establish international peace if democratic norm are 
applied by all states.  
The reasons behind Kant’s claim are many: First, democracy culture and norms are easy-
going and implies peaceful conflict resolution (B. M. Russett, 1993). Second, democracies share 
common moral values and bonds. Third, democracies have economic cooperation and 
interdependence (Jackson & Sr̜ensen, 2007). Fourth, democratic leaders can’t initiate war without 
a proper justification and the agreement of most of the people which decrease the possibility of 
war (Annan, 2002). Fifth, democracies have division of powers, as well as certain structural and 
institutional constraints like checks and balances that require comprehensive justification of 
decisions and clear consensus before going to war (Kant, 1939). In conclusion, democracy 
promotion can decrease risks in global security by converting authoritarian state to viable 
democracies which hardly engage in wars (Xenias, 2005). 
After the end of the cold war, democracy promotion was included in the foreign policy 
agenda of international actors. It was argued that the goal of its inclusion was not for the sole 
purpose of democracy and human rights themselves, but it was targeting the usual foreign policy 
concerns, which are national security and economic interests (Kroft, 2006). Furthermore, 
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Democracy promotion support actors’ national interests and promotes peace, as indicated by Cox 
(Cox, Ikenberry, & Inoguchi, 2000), and it limits terrorism (Hoveyda, 2004). Moreover, domestic 
politics of the international actors play an important role in shaping its foreign policies, including 
democracy promotion policy (Youngs, 2002).  
The theatrical reasons behind democracy promotion by international actors can be 
summed up as; advancing security, harnessing economic interest, and achieving domestic 
political gain by the international actors’ administration. 
2. EU foreign policy challenges 
 
In the case the EU relation with its southern and eastern neighboring regions, EU faces 
several challenges that forced it to restructure its foreign policy in the neighborhood. The 
challenges are, immigration issues, Islamic extremism, energy security, regional security, peace 
process, and international trade (Pearce, 2007). The EU endorses a democracy promotion policy 
as a way to deal with those challenges by establishing neighboring governments that share EU’s 
values, which facilitate the cooperation between the EU and those governments. 
The first EU’s concern in the neighborhood is illegal Immigration. It is one of the most 
debatable issues concerning the EU. In 2013, The EU Frontex agency reported that over 60,000 
illegal immigrants where recorded to cross the sea between North Africa and Italy shores 
(Frontex, 2014). The same agency expected this number to increase to 100,000 illegal immigrants 
in 2014, as for the period January to April 2014, 42,000 migrants were detected. The unrecorded 
numbers of illegal immigrants may exceed 600,000 per year (Frontex, 2014). 
Immigrants affect the EU’s polity, economy, and society. The EU’s polity is affected by 
immigration, as it becomes an issue of tension among political actors. On one side, political 
groups demand protection of the EU from the new visitors. Other political groups call for 
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inclusion of immigrants and their right for political participation and citizenship (EMN, 2006). 
The EU’s economy is affected by immigration, as immigrants usually charge lower wages than 
EU’s citizens do. This pressures the EU’s job markets, income schemes, informal sector, 
competition, as well as import and export activities. The EU’s society is affected by immigration, 
as they change the cultural contexts in European societies in various ways; fashion sports, 
religious balance, and even food consumption patterns  (EMN, 2006).  Moreover, illegal 
immigration increase concerns of human and drug trafficking at the borders of the EU. In the last 
years, the EU witness increased cross border trafficking of women and children for sexual 
exploitation, also drugs and arms dealing and organized crime (Pearce, 2007). These harmful 
effects put immigration issues up in the foreign policy framework of the EU. 
The second EU’s concern in the neighborhood is the phenomenon of Islamic extremism 
rising. The London and Madrid terrorist attacks in 2004-2005 indicated that the EU is vulnerable 
to the consequences of these phenomenon (Pearce, 2007). Terrorist attacks were eventually 
determined to be the work of Muslim individuals or groups, as a reaction for the support of both 
UK and Spain to the United States in its “War on Terror”(Friesen, 2007). The attacks raise 
questions on the ability of the EU to protect its citizens inside its territories. Moreover, the attacks 
highlight that the consequences of the EU’s foreign policy can impact its internal security. The 
EU seeks to increase border controls and promote western sympathetic governments who 
cooperate to limit Islamic extremism, and help people-to-people integration with the EU. 
The third EU’s concern in the neighborhood is energy security. EU Energy demands 
increase day by day. Thus, EU’s energy security is continuously a big challenge to the EU. The 
EU depends on external energy, where 31% of gas supplies comes from North Africa (Pearce, 
2007)., Egypt is a major transit gateway for oil and gas supplies coming from the region. The EU 
energy situation illustrates that the EU cannot afford instability in the neighboring areas (Pearce, 
2007). Establishing long-term relation with energy sources and gateways is crucial for the EU. 
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The fourth EU’s concern in the neighborhood is internal and Mediterranean security. The 
EU is heavily involved in the security of the Mediterranean region, due, to its close proximity, 
which increase the probability of harmful impacts inside the EU. Instability in Mediterranean 
region makes it difficult for its governments to control the flow of migration, organized crime, 
and extremist groups across their borders to the EU. The EU contributed with society capacity 
building and reform programs to Mediterranean countries, including Egypt in the last years 
(COM, 2011f). Increased cooperation with regional governments on security is crucial to the EU 
internal security. 
The fifth EU’s concern in the neighborhood is trade. The EU maintains strong economic 
and trade ties with the Southern Mediterranean. In 2009, the EU imported €105 billion and 
exported €119 billion to the Southern Mediterranean region (COM, 2010). This accounted for 
approximately 10% of total EU trade for that year. Increased cooperation with regional 
governments on trade is an important issue to both the EU and the neighboring counties. 
To address the above-mentioned EU’s concern in the region, the EU undergoes wide 
range of strategies. One of those strategies is the promotion of strong liberal democracies in the 
neighboring counties. This strategy was seen as a way to moderate those threats (Pearce, 2007), 
as it hypothetically will create governments that are share common values with the EU and 
increase the chance for economic development in those countries. EU’s democracy promotion 
policy in Egypt can be viewed as a part of this strategy.   
3. The importance of Egypt to the EU 
 
As the most  populated Southern Mediterranean EU neighboring country, Euro med 
Survey places Egypt as a key power in the geopolitical redesign of the Mediterranean (IEMed, 
2013). Egypt is an indispensable partner for several reasons. 
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The factors that contribute to Egypt’s geopolitical power from EU perspective can be 
illustrated as follows: first, Egypt resides in a strategic position as a land bridge linking two 
continents together and a connection between two important waterways, the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Indian Ocean. Whereby, significant amount of oil, gas and 22% of the entire world’s 
container traffic goes through the Suez Canal or through pipelines across Egypt. This 
geographical location connects Egypt directly to European economy and energy security. Egypt’s 
strategic position makes it the main transit pathway of energy resources from the Persian Gulf to 
markets through the Suez Canal and the Sumed (Suez-Mediterranean) oil (COM, 2008). In 
addition, Egypt cooperated on the further construction of the Arab Gas  pipeline, which should 
enhance the region’s and (in the future) the EU’s energy security (COM, 2009). Through that, 
Egypt is competing to act as a hub that links the region’s energy to EU energy supply network, 
which increases the importance of Egypt’s long term stability to EU.  
A Memorandum of Understanding between Egypt and the EU on strengthened energy 
cooperation was signed in 2008. The Memorandum cover the areas of energy market reforms and 
convergence of Egypt’s energy market with that of the EU, promotion of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency, development of energy networks as well as technological and industrial 
cooperation(COM, 2009). 
Second, Egypt is an opinion leader for much of the developing countries, notably Arab 
and African countries. Countries look up for Egypt’s guidance and position in different 
international affairs to follow. In UN General Assembly meeting, Egypt’s representative, 
historically, speaks in the name of the Arab group, or the African group, or the Non Aligned 
states (Khalifa & Bakr, 1978), which makes Egypt’s position mush more than a single country 
position. An example for the regional influence of Egypt was when Egypt performed a leading 
role in criminalizing Iraq invasion to Kuwait in the 90’s, such action opened the door for an 
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international coalition to act and liberate Kuwait (Abo El-Gheit, 2012). Such a leading role makes 
Egypt’s position in international affairs significant to EU.  
Third, Global Firepower in its Power Index report ranked Egypt as the strongest military 
power in the Arab world, especially after the destruction of Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen armed 
forces in the recent years. The Egyptian military is also one of the biggest military in the 
Mediterranean region. on Global firepower index, Egypt is ranked 13 while greater armies in 
Mediterranean like France is ranked 6, Turkey ranked 8 Israel ranked 11, and  Italy is ranked 12. 
This rank is significant if it is compared with other regional powers like Iran which ranks 22.  
This indicates the significant strength of Egypt military that can contribute to Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean stability and security. Egypt is an active partner for the EU on Common Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) matters (COM, 2011f). Egypt also contributes to peace-keeping forces in 
Darfur (including a military field hospital) alongside UN/AU forces (COM, 2010). Getting Egypt 
on EU’s side in regional conflicts will guarantee proper access to Egypt’s military resources when 
needed, through Egypt being a part of the Common Security and Foreign Policy framework 
(CSFP) of the EU (COM, 2011f, 2013b, 2013b).  
Fourth, Egypt constitutes a major partner for combating terror. The EU suffers from 
terrorist attacks in London and married bombings. Even before those attacks, The EU exercises 
significant efforts in combating terrorism. Cooperation with the Egyptian government and 
military is crucial to facilitate those efforts and ensure better results. As indicate in 2008 ENP 
progress report, the Egyptian government is committed to the fight against terrorism and to 
cooperation with the EU on this issue (COM, 2009).  
Fifth, as a low-middle income country and with a population of over 90 million, Egypt is 
considered an attractive market for the European products. Egypt progress report 2011 indicated 
that Egypt remained a key trading partner for the EU in the region (COM, 2011f). The Egypt-EU 
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trade balance of 2013 is about 22 billion Euros, which is a 6% lower than 2012. EU gets 
significant raw materials, textile, and vegetables from Egypt and exports machineries, 
technologies, and transportation vehicles to Egypt. Maintaining such economic relation and 
advancing it is crucial to both Egypt and the EU. 
Sixth, Egypt constitutes a major partner for combating illegal immigration to the EU. For 
the fact that, EU one sided border security cannot succeed alone to combat such a phenomena. 
Egyptian government cooperated with EU in the fight against illegal immigration, and 
management of legal migration and implementation of migration plans (COM, 2004). In addition, 
the EU works on the root causes of illegal immigration by trying to make the origin countries 
better living places, through socio-economic development in those countries. In addition, EU 
compact illegal immigration by setting up programs to select and qualify the needed immigrants 
from neighboring countries, like the Italian employment program with the Egyptian ministry of 
manpower, and the Italian certified vocational education program in some Egyptian Mechanical 
schools.  
Finally, the success of a democratic transition in Egypt can also set a model that be 
replicated in the same way resulting in regional spread of democracy. During her visit to Egypt in 
2012, Aston stated that steps forward in Egypt are crucial for democracy-building in the Middle 
East and North Africa (EEAS, 2012e). The same concept was restated by the joint statement of 
Ashton and Kerry during 2013 events. The joint statement noted,” We are convinced that a 
successful democratic transition can help Egypt lead the rest of the region toward a better future, 
as it has so often done during its rich and proud history.” (EU, 2013). 
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4. Why is it vital for the EU to help establish democracy in Egypt 
  
After having established how important Egypt is to the EU, it is only logical to assume 
that the democratization of Egypt that will transcend its borders and impact on the neighboring 
Middle Eastern countries is primarily in the EU’s interests. Establishing a democracy in Egypt 
can address the EU’s concerns in the region through four ways.  
First, the newly established democratic regime is expected to increasingly cooperate with 
the EU. As explained by Kant Democratic Peace Theory, democracies tend to cooperate with 
each other more than other do (Jackson & Sr̜ensen, 2007). Thus, increased cooperation is 
expected between the newly established democratic regime in Egypt and the democratic EU. This 
increased cooperation can serve as a facilitator for EU’s efforts in the fields of security, energy, 
trade, regional conflict resolution, fight on terror, and illegal immigration. The increased 
cooperation can serve the EU’s global positions in international affairs, by utilizing Egypt opinion 
leading position on some other countries. 
Second, on the longer term the EU believes that, the establishing  a democracy in Egypt 
will have its positive impacts on citizens prosperity (COM, 2013b, 2014a). The EU is expecting 
that, the democratic government in Egypt will respect the rule of law, freedom of speech, an 
independent judiciary, and minorities’ rights (COM, 2013b, 2014a). Moreover, The EU is 
expecting that, with increased transparency and accountability in the democratic system, 
corruption rates will decrease (COM, 2013b, 2014a). These factors should lead to economic 
development and better life for the Egyptian citizens. Such condition can decrease the rate of 
illegal immigration and terror threats from Egypt to the EU. Moreover, it will increase the 
Egyptian market size and its ability to absorb more EU’s products, which can benefit the EU 
international trade volume. 
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Third, the established democracy in Egypt can be a model that may replicate in the 
region, as explained in the previous section. The spread of democracy in the region will decrease 
the possibility of future regional conflicts, according to ’The Democratic Peace Theory’ 
explained earlier in this section. This will aid EU’s goal of establishing a peaceful neighborhood. 
Fourth, the established democracy in Egypt will create shared values between the 
Egyptian and the European society. This will lead to closer people-to-people relation, and 
smoother Egypt-EU integration. This will contribute to the safety and prosperity of both the 
neighborhood and the EU in the long term.   
For pervious reasons democracy promotion in Egypt had become an increasingly 
important policy. The success of the policy could contribute to the EU security, control illegal 
immigration, and organized crime, guarantee reliable access to energy resources and coordination 
on issues of national security and global matters.  
5. EU democracy promotion and the Egyptian transition  
 
High representative Catherine Ashton stated in her speech at the European Parliament, 
Strasbourg, 27th September 2011 : 
“Our response … is built on the need to acknowledge past mistakes and listen without 
imposing. We are doing exactly that and it requires perseverance and sustained 
commitment. Success should translate into what I have called ‘deep 
democracy’.”(Balfour, 2012b). 
The EU policy change during transition will be addressed according to the analysis model 
in six areas; context, actors, process, issues, instruments, outcome. This section will discuss each 
area in four different periods in transition; Mubarak era, SCAF era, Morsi era, and post-Morsi 
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era, which ends with the Egyptian presidential election 2014. In each period, the section will 
highlight the Egyptian situation and EU position and actions regarding democracy promotion in 
Egypt. 
5.1. Local Context  
 
This subsection will discuss the changes that happened in the local context in Egypt across 
different periods in the study. It will also highlight the EU reaction to these changes in relation to 
the EU democracy promotion policy. The discussion, in this subsection, will be limited to local 
Egyptian events that triggered documented response from the EU in the form of press releases or 
reports from the EU institutions. 
i. The Mubarak era 
During Mubarak era, in the light of Egypt’s ENP country progress reports 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, EU views Egypt as an active partner in ENP that shows strong commitment to social and 
economic reforms, and weak commitment to political reform (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). 
During that era, the democracy situation in Egypt was stagnant, while the regime maintained a 
thirty years state of emergency that undermined the basic rights of citizens especially in freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, independent justice and media (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011f). Police abused its authorities and use brutal methods, including torture, to control the 
population  (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). In spite of such violation for human rights, women 
and child rights have reported measurable progress during Mubarak era (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011f), with new legislation and active national councils. 
In the same era, elections were systemically rigged and the ruling party won the majority in 
each election up to 95% in some times  (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). Local and international 
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election observation was either rejected, in the case of international including EU, or restricted in 
the case of the local (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f).  
The EU was interested in democracy promotion during that era. The EU softly adopted a 
democracy promotion strategy by being reactive to issues related to violation of human rights and 
democratic norms by the Egyptian regime. The progress reports in this period shows that the 
major events which trigger EU reactions were issues related to human rights like freedom of 
assembly and association, freedom of expression, women’s rights, child rights, prisoners’ rights, 
rights of minorities mainly religious minorities especially Christians, refugee rights, and labor 
rights  (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f).  The EU statements regarding those issues aimed to 
push the Egyptian regime to reform them. For the same reason, the EU addressed the Egyptian 
government several times to protect minorities. European External Action Services (EEAS) 
issued a press statement following the attack against worshipers at Coptic Church in Alexandria 
at 2011 New Year’s Eve. The statement included an expression of concern about the situation of 
religious minorities in Egypt and a call for immediate government response to protect them 
(EEAS, 2011a).  
The EU’s efforts to push the regime for democratic reform were facing resistance from the 
Egyptian administration. In 2010, Egypt’s ENP country progress report highlighted that no 
progress appear in the area of human rights and democratic reforms, as the Egyptian 
administration is interested to tackle governance issue separately from the ENP reform agenda 
(European Commission, 2010). The report mentioned the continuation of the state of emergency 
for about 30 years as a major issue of concern and disappointment in the field of rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Commission, 2010) 
Beside EU’s advocacy for human rights, in Mubarak era, the EU focused on practicing 
democracy through following elections procedures. The EU was closely following all elections 
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events like 2007 constitutional referendum, 2008 Shura council election, local council election, 
and 2010 parliamentary election (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). EU also follows legislations 
change like restructuring the justice administration especially the supreme constitutional court, 
legislations related to political participation or human rights like election law and NGOs law 
(COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). The close follow up to the election procedures and legislation 
process was accompanied by EU official statements that criticize the processes for systemic 
violations, low turnover, and deviation from democratic norms by preventing access to polls by 
observers , candidates’ representatives and media (COM, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011f). The EU uses 
such events to advocate for political reform in Egypt.   The EU included those criticisms in 
Egypt’s ENP annual progress reports. The inclusion of the EU concerns in Egypt’s ENP country 
progress reports was a tool to institutionalize the required reform. Those progress reports will be 
the base of evaluation of the country and the foundation of the next year plan, which will 
determine the cooperation level between Egypt and the EU, where bad progress report will entail 
lower cooperation in the coming years; however, in the Egyptian case this was never happened. 
In spite of elections and human rights violation, the EU continues to cooperate with Mubarak 
regime on a progressing manner. This was due to the demand for regional stability as it was seen 
achievable during these times thought the authoritarian control provided by Mubarak. The EU 
never applied conditionality and always works to enhance engagement. This was one of the major 
criticisms to the EU policy as it appears in coherent with the EU principles of respect for human 
right and democracy.   
On the Egyptian side, the regime was keen to present its opens to the EU. The regime 
underwent several step for political reform. Constitutional amendments in 2007 open the road to 
peaceful transfer of power by having 2 times limit for the presidential terms. Human rights 
violation was addressed by the establishment of the National Human rights Council as 
independent body with significant mandate and headed by international reputable figure like Dr. 
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Ghali. Moreover, Egypt reported a major progress in both women and child rights. The Egyptian 
regime was dealing with the issue of democracy as a long-term process. Officials usually answer 
the EU criticisms by several arguments. First, democracy is a process that must take proper time 
to be internalized as a culture before it is completely applied in the political system. Second, 
democracy and governance is considered as an internal affair where recommendation is 
welcomed but criticism is not acceptable.  Third, there are steps that have been achieved and 
more steps are coming in the near future. Fourth, Egypt is heading to build its own type of 
democracy that is compatible with its culture and not necessary the type of democracy know in 
the west. Fifth, Egyptian culture now is not ready for democracy. Egyptian regime responses 
together with the important of Egypt to the EU contributed to a reluctant EU position to push hard 
for democratization in Egypt during Mubarak era. 
Early in 2011, Lack of democracy, police brutality and impunity, corruption and poor living 
conditions generate popular discontent led to January 2011 event. The events started by mass 
protests followed by a set in that resulted president Mubarak resignation and army take over 
power. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces SCAF promised political reforms during the 
coming transition period. 
ii. The post-January 25 events. 
During SCAF era, EU continued to view Egypt as a strategic partner (COM, 2012b). 
SCAF was committed to political reform, where amendment to 1971 constitution was passed 
introducing a major change in the political system in Egypt. The amendments were followed by 
reforms in political parties law and political participation law, both changes paved the road to free 
and fair election (COM, 2012b). This led to the newly formed Islamist parties winning the  
majority of votes and appointing a member of the Muslim Brotherhood party  as president. The 
period witnessed an increased activities of civil society, indicated by 4500 new registered NGO 
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was found during that era. This can be understood through several reasons; first, Egyptian people 
feel the value and the need for civil organizations. Second, the regime was much open for 
freedom of organization as a way to portray a pro-democratic values appearance to grabs 
international legitimacy.  
The political situation was in the making and political context in Egypt was still 
developing. EU recognizes this fact, as Ashton stated in her statement before the European 
parliament on 12 October 2011 “….real change does take time and we know that will be 
measured in years and not in seasons. But we also recognize the importance of our continuing 
support and tonight we will focus on Egypt….” (Ashton, 2011).  
SCAF invited international observers to witness election. The international observation 
mission, at that era was similar to Mubarak era with limits in numbers, time, and resources. 
However, the EU considers that invitation a step that signal openness and fairness of the election 
process under the SCAF, and this was welcomed by the EU (EEAS, 2012f). In spite of that the 
EU’s offer to launch full fledge election observation mission was rejected by the SCAF (COM, 
2012b).  
In the same period, massive violation of human rights against protesters by excessive use 
of violence, illegal detention, military trials, and female virginity tests (COM, 2012b). The EU 
refers to the local context, in SCAF era, as being turbulent (EEAS, 2012c), with ongoing political 
and economic uncertainty (COM, 2012b).  
One of the main remarks in that era was the rise of Islamists. While the uprising was 
secular in origin, faith based parties were successful to mark their position as key players in the 
newly formed  pluralistic political arena (Balfour, 2012a). The Islamist parties demonstrate an 
unusual understanding of democracy. They view democracy from Shariaa perspective, where 
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people have the right to participate in deciding public affair through Shoura mechanism; however, 
the freedom of expression and other freedoms will be limited to the boundaries of Islamic Sharia.  
In this era, similar events to Mubarak era events, triggered EU reactions. EU continued to be 
vocal on human  rights, minorities rights and violence. In response to violent clashes during a 
Christian activist protest in front of the state TV, the EU issued an official statement.   In the 
statement, Ashton expressed deep concerns about violence against a peaceful demonstration by 
the Coptic Christian community and calls the Egyptian administration to restrain to peaceful 
measures of conflict resolution and to launch an independent investigation on the 
incidence(Ashton, 2011). This indicates the continuation of the EU strategy to use such events to 
push for democratic reform and human rights in Egypt during SCAF era, similar to Mubarak era. 
However, in both SCAF and Morsi eras, the EU was more vocal on democratization and use 
much more clearer explicit demands, which will be discussed later in the analysis. 
During that era, the EU continues to defend civil society and activists in multiple occasions. 
For example regarding the trial of 6 April movement member, Asmaa Mahfouz , Ashton stated 
“…the trial of Asmaa Mahfouz is a case in point and is of great concern, as have been other 
instances of pressure on peaceful civil society actors…” (EEAS, 2012f). Defending Assma 
Mahouz was a symbolic act by the EU to advocate freedom of expression and freedom of 
organization as foundation of any democratic system. This also indicates the continuation of the 
same EU’s democracy promotion strategy from Mubarak era, as EU defended Essra Abdalefatah, 
6 of April movement cofounder, in similar case during Mubarak era. The impact of the EU 
intervention on both cases was weak as both cases went in normal trail procedures. However the 
intervention was a tool to add public criticism to the Egyptian regime and to give activists 
worldwide attention to their causes. 
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EU continuously closely follow elections events as noted in EEAS press release, that Ashton 
stated “ …The upcoming elections are a very important step and I hope they can go ahead as 
planned…”  (EEAS, 2011d). The election process during that period was marked by EU as major 
sign for political openness, as noted by Ashton ‘welcome the smooth conduct of the referendum 
which was generally held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. It shows Egypt is making 
good progress towards a more open political system.’ (EEAS, 2011b).  
The statements reflect that the EU was closely following up the Egyptian election processes 
and that there is a change in the EU’s reaction toward election management in Egypt. Such 
change in the EU attitude was a direct result for the change in the Egyptian administration 
election management style. The EU included such positive remarks on election in the annual 
progress report. This inclusion signal openness from the EU for more relation and more support 
to the newly formed democracy in Egypt. This highlight a new strategy from the EU in applying 
democracy promotion, which is “More for More”. In other words, the more Egyptian 
administration is open for democracy the more cooperation between Egypt and the EU will be 
applied. 
In SCAF era, the EU reaction was triggered, like in Mubarak era, by constitutional and 
legislative changes. The March 2011 constitution amendments, political parties’ law changes, and 
emergency state expiration, all generated positive EU reactions. The country progress report, of 
that period, considered those legislative changes to represent a major improvement in the political 
sphere (COM, 2012b). The situation of the state of emergency continued to cause EU reactions, 
EEAS press release noted,” The EU welcomes the expiration of the state of emergency in Egypt.” 
(EEAS, 2012b).  
As highlighted earlier, the expiration of the state of emergency in Egypt was a long-standing 
demand of the EU. This was considered a major step toward preparing the proper environment for 
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democratic practices.  EU highlighted its ability and willingness to increase cooperation with 
Egypt in response to those positive developments.  This indicates the application of the EU’s 
“More for More” strategy to push the Egyptian administration to move forward in the path to 
democracy. 
Other events related to change in the transition road map had generated EU reactions. In June 
2012, the EU reacted strongly on the dissolution of the Egyptian parliament1 and to the 
constitutional declaration2 that outlined the new president competencies. EEAS press release 
highlighted the EU’s concerns about those events and its effect on drafting the new constitution. 
The press release described Ashton reaction as, “…She is, however, concerned about latest 
institutional developments surrounding the vote, in particular the dissolution of parliament and 
the constitutional declaration of 17 June, which seriously constrains the powers of the President, 
and creates uncertainties about the drafting of a new constitution.” (EEAS, 2012d).  
The EU restrained to its old strategy by being that vocal on a court decision. The old strategy 
of using political and legal events to criticize the Egyptian administration and push for democratic 
reforms was reapplied again similar to Mubarak era. 
In addition, the EU reacted strongly on the crackdown on civil society. During SCAF era, 
several NGOs were accused by receiving illegal foreign funding. Egyptian and foreign workers in 
those NGOs were arrested, NGOs documents and computers were confiscated, and there offices 
were shut down. EEAS press release stated, "The EU calls on the Egyptian authorities to respect 
Freedom of Association and to adopt a Law on Associations and Foundations which will be 
consistent with international standards."(EEAS, 2012a). The statement indicates the continuation 
 
1 Egypt's high administrative court on Saturday upheld a controversial decision to dissolve parliament. 
Following to that, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces dissolved parliament in line with that ruling 
from the High Constitutional Court that declared the constitutional articles that regulated parliamentary 
elections were invalid. 
2 The ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf) issued a supplementary constitutional 
declaration limiting the president's powers and granting itself greater prerogatives. 
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of the EU strategy to support civil society and advocate for freedom of expression and freedom of 
organization. 
It is clear that the change in local context influence EU policy, as the EU reaction to the same 
events increase in SCAF era. EU following up to events was closer because of the critical 
situation and the huge need for information. The multiple visits, the   number of EU statement, its 
frequency, and small time gaps between the events and the statement all indicate the increased 
efforts to follow up the dynamic changes in Egypt. However, the issues of concern remain similar 
with the addition of transition period-related issues like institutional setbacks in the case of 
dissolution of the parliament, and incidence related issues in the case of the NGOs case.  
One final change that happened in the EU democracy promotion strategy during SCAF era is 
that the EU was directly speaking about democratization. This was not the case during Mubarak 
time, as the EU was usually speaking on human rights and indirectly linking it with democracy. 
This was due to the EU strategy to maintain regional stability under Mubarak control.  An EU 
official highlighted in an interview that the open speaking on democratization after 2011 was a 
result of the contextual changes in Egypt; the new context gives the EU the opportunity to speak 
openly on democratization, as it was a public demand. An analysis to the frequency of the word 
“human rights” and the word “democracy” in the EU documents under study in both Mubarak 
and SCAF eras indicate that the use of the word “democracy” increased in SCAF era by 87% 
more than the increase in the use of the word “human rights”. This was an empirical evidence that 
the EU was more engaged in direct advocacy for democracy in SCAF era than in Mubarak era.  
The causes of that is discussed in section 6. 
iii. The Morsi Period 
On June 2012, SCAF handed power to the first elected President Mohamed Morsi. Morsi era 
was view by EU as a complex mixed period where its outcomes are open (COM, 2013b). The 
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elected president takes major steps for civilian control over armed forces, 2012 progress report 
noted that the President undertook an extensive reshuffle of the military and subordinated the 
military establishment to the elected civilian executive (COM, 2013b). He also facilitated drafting 
a new constitution. However, the process was highly criticized by opposition for being exclusive 
and undermining the fundamentals human rights, which resulted in deep division of the 
community (COM, 2013b). The constitutional declaration by president Morsi to safeguard the 
constructional assembly was considered a major setback against democratic norms and an attempt 
to harness more power to himself and his party.  
During this era, several clashes with violence had been reported in front of the presidential 
palace, as a new place for protesting. Freedom of media and expression was uplifted, military 
trials was limited and the president formed a committee to study the cases that were previously 
sentenced by military court and he pardoned a lot of them; conversely, few journalists were 
trailed by insulting the president (COM, 2013b).  
During this era, EU continued to react to the same events, defending same causes, and 
advocating for the same values, just like the past eras with addition to few new areas, which will 
be discussed later. 2012 country progress report shows remarks on similar violation on human 
rights like 2011 and 2010 reports (COM, 2010, 2011f, 2012b) . The report noted that many of the 
recommendations are as valid today as they were in 2011. This indicated the continuation of the 
same EU’s democracy promotion strategies from the last two eras. 
During Morsi era, EU increased its engagement, support to civil society, the High 
Representative meets civil society representatives in her visits to Egypt, and continuously 
advocate for their inclusion in the decision-making and advocacy for reforming NGOs 
legislations. She stated, “…meetings with civil society have been successful. I said to the 
president this morning that they are important it is, that they're fully involved in the present and 
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of course the future of this country.” (Ashton, 2012b). The call to involve civil society in 
decision-making was intended by the EU to institutionalize participatory deep democratic 
practices in Egypt. This indicates a development in the EU democracy promotion strategy in 
Morsi era. The EU moved forward, from establishing principles of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms together with democratic procedures like free and fair election during the last two eras, 
to advocating for institutionalization of deep democracy. This can be considered a step further in 
promoting democracy in Egypt. 
The Egyptian bureaucracy (old/deep state) did not welcome the EU support to Egyptian civil 
society. An EU official stated in an interview,” Civil society is an important component of any 
democracy, while Egyptian bureaucracy still did not recognize it as a full partner in 
development”.  Egyptian bureaucracy (old/deep state) views civil society participation in public 
affairs as interference with the government jurisdictions, which is not welcomed nor accepted.  
Moreover, the bureaucracy views the possibility of the EU funding to civil society as a clear 
competition on foreign funding for government projects and channeling the money to less 
important issues while the government is in need for that money to support its projects. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian bureaucracy (old/deep state) views some civil society activity 
especially those related to human right s and democratization as a threat to national security. 
Thus, the EU increased support for civil society caused tension with the Egyptian government. 
An example of that tension was in the emergence of an extraordinary conflict with the 
Egyptian government, when the EU invited members of Egyptian civil society to be a part of 
Egypt-EU task force in November 2012. The Egyptian government stands strong against that 
invitation. It demands an exclusive meeting in the absence of civil society. The problem grew 
bigger and threatened the whole taskforce operation. The situation was solved by holding a side 
meeting with civil society as a symbolic participation only.  
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The participation of civil society in the task force was accepted by the newly elected regime. 
However, the presence of civil society was total opposed by those who run the foreign relation for 
the last decades. This raise another important phenomenon occurred during Morsi era. The 
internal conflicts between the old regime officials and the new democratic structures, which was 
refereed as the fight with deep state.   
These internal conflicts give contradicting messages to the EU foreign policy makers. An EU 
official stated, “I meet someone in the president office to get to know the strategic vision of the 
country, then two days later I try to communicate my understanding to the responsible official. I 
was confused by the answer; it was totally different strategic outlook”. This hinders the action of 
the EU in Egypt. Another official stated.”…we can’t act if we don’t have a clear strategy”. 
During Morsi era the EU advocate for inclusive democracy to address its concerns of 
marginalization several political groups and expected limitation in minorities’ rights. When 
violent clashes between factions of the society occurred in that era, the EU reacted by calling for 
inclusive process and social dialogue. Such a new phenomenon in Egypt raises the EU concerns 
on the inclusiveness of the democratic process under Morsi administration. The EU calls for 
inclusive democracy in multiple events and the EU start to realize the limitation of democratic 
practices under Morsi administration.  
The significant observation on the EU’s advocacy for democracy during Morsi era was that 
the EU bring advocacy to a higher level. The EU start to demand not only democracy as free and 
fair election procedure or institutionalized rights in the constitution but it goes beyond that to call 
for deep democracy and inclusive democracy. The appearance of those wards in the data set in 
increased by 47% in Morsi ear over the SCAF era, and it was lowered again in the after Morsi 
era. The words never appeared in Mubarak era. The reason behind this can be understood as the 
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EU was addressing different concerns in different eras according to the actions of the Egyptian 
administration.   
During Morsi era, women rights situation was in a critical situation. On one hand increase 
violation and violence against women, and on the other hand, undermine women representation in 
political process. EU recognized this setback on women situation and act to counter this problem. 
Ashton addressed Egyptian women groups saying, “You fear that women's rights are not a 
priority in this ongoing transition phase. And you are right. And of course that is wrong” (Ashton, 
2012a). EU organized " Egyptian Women: The Way Forward"  conference just one month after 
Morsi’s election (Ashton, 2012a). In addition, women issue was on the agenda of almost every 
meeting between Egyptian and EU  officials, as noted by EU official. The phenomena was 
emphasized more by the lack of language on gender in the regime communication and the attempt 
to amend the personal status law (Ashton, 2012a).  
An additional remarkable change in the context is the responsiveness of the regime to EU 
criticism against human right violation. Mubarak and SCAF regimes were constant on not to act 
under pressure of criticism or some time act later. However, Morsi administration acted fast and 
tried to correct action in a more responsive way. The case of the Detention of Ahmed Maher 
during May 2013 explains that. After Maher detention, EEAS press release noted that, “The High 
Representative is concerned about the detention on Friday at the Cairo international airport of 
Ahmed Maher, leader of the 6 April Movement.”.Few days later, Ahmed Maher was freed. In the 
same case, during Mubarak time, Ahmed served months before he was freed. The interesting 
observation is that the context came back to normal after Morsi, where Ahmed is jailed and the 
EU continues to issue statements to free him with no response from the after Morsi Egyptian 
regime.  
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The responsiveness to criticism on human rights was not the only notable difference between 
regimes in transition. Though the interviews, another major ideological difference was recorded 
to affect the regime interactions with EU policies. Mubarak and SCAF regimes endorse a 
nationalistic ideology, which resists international norm by arguing about state sovereignty. They 
consider democracy and human rights as an internal affair that states must deal with it internally, 
and international actors must be stay out of it. On the other hand, Morsi administration endorse a 
religious ideology, which also resists international norm by arguing about culture differences, 
thus, they consider democracy as a western values is not applicable by the same method in their 
local culture. However, both the military/authoritarian and the Islamist regimes resist democracy 
promotion effects, EU official noted that, the dialogue with Morsi administration might lead to 
some common ground on the long term, but this was not possible with Mubarak or SCAF 
regimes. The EU official explained the reason behind this concept as the mutual understanding 
and respect to the diversity, which was portrayed by Morsi administration, can bridge culture 
difference on the long term. Moreover, the EU official pointed out the different understanding of 
democracy meaning and values within the Islamist as most of them looks to democracy from the 
perspective of Shariaa, which will deviate the perception away from the norms of liberal 
democracy.   
One more change that occurs during Morsi era is the official invitation for EU to observe 
parliamentary election (COM, 2013b). However, the election was postponed and did not take 
place due to a court ruling. The official invitation was considered a major change in the Egyptian 
government position on international observation, as noted by an EU official. 
At the end of June 2013, mass protests calls for President Morsi to give up power. This was 
followed by an intervention of the armed forces, which ousted Morsi from the Presidential office 
on 3 July 2013. The military appoints an interim president and a new cabinet to run the country. 
The new authorities put forward a new transition road map that includes amendments of 2012 
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constitution and free election for a new president and parliament. This major political change was 
followed by huge protests and sit-ins in several places in Cairo by the Islamists. The government 
was forced to resort to violence to end the sit-ins.  which was cracked violently by the security 
forces in August 2013 resulting numerous numbers of victims after the rejection of the protestors 
all government requested for peaceful solutions and deliberately continue to obstructing normal 
life in the areas they occupy.  
Later the interim administration facilitates the drafting of a new constitution that is believed 
to advance human rights. However, The new constitution removes most of Islamist references its 
predecessor contained, it continues to endorse Islamic Shariaa as the source of legislation and it 
limits the rights of worship to the three ‘religions of the book’, and it continues to allow for 
military trials of civilians(COM, 2014c). It was noted that the drafting committee was not 
inclusive as it contain only one member out of fifty members related to Islamists (COM, 2014c). 
Following the drafting of the new constitution, a referendum was held on January 2014, and led 
to an overwhelming approval of the constitution. However, the voters’ turnout was relatively low 
and there was little room left to the opposition in the electoral campaign.(COM, 2014c). 
Afterward, the second milestone on the road map was concluded by the election of President Sisi 
in June 2014. 
iv. The post-Morsi era 
After Morsi era was characterized by increased violence on every side, crack down on human 
rights, mass death sentence, illegal detention, multiple of terror attacks, limited media freedom, 
harassments to opposition, and a deep split in the society.  The military held great influence over 
key political decisions. The new constitution envisages a high level of autonomy for the military, 
as it would grant a final say over the position of Minister of Defense to the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (COM, 2014c). 
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Freedom of assembly and press freedom deteriorated. TV channels were closed and many 
journalists harassed, including foreigners. In the After Morsi era, the relationship between the 
Egyptian authorities and civil society deteriorated markedly, especially with the human rights 
NGOs. The NGO trial, several arrests and disproportionate sentencing of human right activists 
and the new law on demonstrations were among the cases demonstrating a willingness to reduce 
the voices of independent civil society organizations (COM, 2014c). In September 2013, a court 
banned the Muslim Brotherhood and any related organizations and ordered their assets seized. In 
December 2013, the interim cabinet designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization. 
Considering the ousting of Morsi as a military intervention, the EU viewed this era as a year 
of crises reflecting political instability and threats against achieved democratic reforms by people 
after a massive revolution (COM, 2014d). EU continued to be concerned about political 
polarization, freedom of assembly and press freedom (COM, 2014d).  The EU undertook 
extensive outreach activities. HR/VP Catherine Ashton visited Egypt several times, engaging 
closely with all political parties in order to contribute to overcoming the political mistrust and 
polarization that have characterized the political scene in Egypt and seeking an inclusive solution 
(COM, 2014d). Ashton was the only international leader that met Morsi in custody, where she 
tried to mediate a dialogue between political groups in order to building confidence and get out 
from this very fragile situation. Unfortunately, this effort was not fruitful and both Morsi and the 
SACF retained their conflicting position.  
5.2. Key policy actors  
 
With the Arab Spring in the region, the EU was quick to incur deep changes in its structure 
and positions to deal with the new situations. The EU meant to understand the new demands and 
new thinking of the people in the region and learn how to deal with them. The EU was keen to 
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establish innovative and direct channels for better communication and possibly to influence the 
changes in Egypt. The EU wanted reconciliation and inclusiveness, demands supported by the 
West, which were not reciprocated in Egypt at that time. To achieve that, the EU introduced new 
posts like special representative for South Mediterranean and the special representative  for 
human rights. Moreover, the local EU delegation focuses more on democracy, which stimulated 
the EU policy change. 
Across the study periods, the key actors involved in Egypt-EU relations changed significantly 
in both the EU and Egyptian sides. On the EU’s side, Lisbon treaty got into action just a little 
time before 2011 events. The treaty gives birth to the European External Action services (EEAS) 
as a coordinating body for all EU foreign body with a clear mandate to link both the European 
Commission external actions, conducted by the Directorate Generals, with the European Council 
of ministers external action, conducted by the foreign affairs council. The aim of that change is to 
enhance the EU foreign policy coherence. Moreover, Lisbon treaty changed the role of the EU 
Higher representative to be a double hated position where the High Representative will serve as 
European Council vice president and in the same time the HR will chair the foreign affairs 
council. The double hated concept enhanced communication and organization of the EU foreign 
policy. In the new structure, the relation between Egypt and the EU was controlled by the EEAS 
to a greater extend. This change in the EU actors structure increased the EU capacity to deliver 
actions related to foreign policy in more coherent way, which in turn influence the policy 
outcomes.  EU official noted that the new structure enhance engagement, increase the focus and 
synergy the action of the multiple institutions involved in EU foreign policy. 
Additional change was made later at July 2011 by the appointment of Mr. Bernardino Leon 
as an EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean." With the momentous changes 
going on in the Southern Mediterranean, the new EUSR will have a crucial role as the EU steps 
up in its response to the transformations in the region," said Ashton (EEAS, 2011c). His mandate 
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is to enhance the EU's political dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries  and contribute to 
the EU's response to the Arab Spring with the focus on strengthening democracy (EEAS, 2011c). 
Mr. Leon conducted several visits to Egypt meeting with wide range of political and social 
actors to help enhance communication, information sharing and understanding between both EU 
and Egyptian sides. He even worked intensively to urge the government and opposition parties, 
after 2013 events, to begin a process of genuine reconciliation, and move ahead inclusively to 
consider amendments to the Constitution and prepare as quickly as possible for Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections (EU, 2013). 
Another Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis was appointed as EU Special 
Representative for Human Rights. Mr. Lambrinidis role is to enhance the effectiveness and 
visibility of EU policy in the field of human rights and support for democracy.  His mandate 
includes building genuine partnership with civil society. He works closely with the European 
External Action Service on a broad, flexible mandate, giving him the ability to adapt to 
circumstances, and will with full EEAS support. Mr. Lambrinidis, visited Egypt several times, 
engaging closely with all political parties to help overcome mistrust and polarization. These 
efforts were increased after the ousting of Morsi.  
The structural changes in EU foreign policy reflected more interest and focus on democracy 
promotion. This was reflected also in the local EU delegation as they responded with more focus 
on democracy to support the new structure. EU delegation official noted, “…we report to 
Brussels and they use those reports to adjust the policy”. This highlighted the instrumental role of 
the local delegation not only in the Implementation process but also in the policy formulation 
process. 
Egyptian side 
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The Egyptian side during SCAF, Morsi and after Morsi eras had significant changes in the 
actors involved in foreign affairs. Multiple changes happened in government and legislation 
bodies. The introduction of several new actors like Islamist parties, women groups and youth 
movements. The change also was notable in the increased involvement of the military institution, 
the local political and social leaders, and the local civil society. Finally, another unexpected actor 
was the Egyptian people themselves.   
Since January 28 2011, the Egyptian government underwent swift changes3 of one 
government after the other with changes in the leaders of the Egyptian foreign policy. The change 
of the Egyptian political leadership and three governments with four different foreign ministers in 
one year was an earthquake in the management of Egypt-EU relation. “Each government official 
comes to office with his own vision about priorities…” said an EU official. The EU official 
continued, “ …and we must rearrange everything according to that”. The influence of the 
multiple changes in Egyptian government was one of the major reasons for the changes in EU 
polices toward Egypt. It also affect the coordination efforts on the local and international levels 
between Egypt and EU member states. 
The change in the political leadership and in the prime minster position was with significant 
impact on Egypt-EU relation. Morsi’s Islamist background introduced concerns from some 
European politicians. They argue that supporting Morsi can be an action that is similar to support 
 
3 Ahmed Safik was appointed prime minster and the kept Ahmed Abo-Elghait as a foreign minister from 
the former cabinet structure. However the government last only for 33 days. The SCAF appointed Essam 
Sharaf as a prime minter where he appointment Nabil Elaraby as a foreign minister. Elarabi was appointed 
only 2 months later as the general secretary of the Arab League. Mohamed Elorabi was appointed in Sharaf 
cabinet after that. A month later, Elorabi reigned during Sharaf cabinet reshuffle in June 2011. Mohamed 
Kamel Amr was appointed instead of him. In December 2011, SCAF appoint Kamal El Ganzori as a new 
prime minster in what so called the national salvation government. Ganzori kept Mohamed Kamel Amr as 
in the same position as a foreign minister. After Morsi inauguration, he appointed Hisham Kandil as a 
prime minister. While, Kandil kept Mohamed Kamel Amr in his cabinet. Following the armed forces 
ousted Mosri, interim president Adly Mansur appointed Hazem Elbeblay as a prime minister where he 
appointed Nabil Fahmy as a foreign affairs minter. Fahmy stayed in position tell the end of the study period 
in June 2014.   
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terror organizations. However, such concerns did not encourage any changes in the EU position 
of supporting the newly elected administration.  
In a period less than three years, Egypt had four different political leaderships, seven cabinets 
with 6 different prime ministers. The transfer of office in each time was harsh and gave no room 
to handout political files between the former and the new officials. EU official noted, the EU 
coordination efforts with any government were lost after they are out of office and we have to 
start over again every time, this was a huge loss of efforts and opportunities.  
The change in government was accompanied with change in the legislative bodies. Normally, 
the parliament and Shura Council did not usually play an important role in foreign relation in 
Egypt. However, during transition their role was increased in foreign policy. In 2011, SACF 
dissolute 2010 parliament and accompanied Shura Council, leaving a big vacuum in the political 
system due to the absence of legislative bodies.  
In 2012 the elected parliament was dominated by Islamist. Issues related to foreign relations, 
democracy and human rights were handled in an unusual matter. New faces were present in the 
meeting with new ideas and a different understanding on the norm and values of democracy and 
human rights as described earlier. The parliament selected the first and second constitutional 
committee, amended the election law, amended the political participation law, amended the 
presidential election law, tackled the NGOs law, women rights, minorities rights, and refuges 
rights, with not only legislations but with direct engagement and field trips. These activities 
intersected with EU democracy promotion areas of interest, thus, the parliament profile in EU 
perspective was elevated. EU official rearing to NGOs law noted, “….at that time we try to meet 
the parliament members to advocate for a more liberal law to organize civil society ”. The EU 
High Representative and both of the special representatives held several meeting with the speaker 
of the house and with both the foreign affairs and human rights committees in the parliament. The 
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dissolution of the parliament was considered by EU as a major setback against the democratic 
road map promised by the SCAF (COM, 2013b). The absence of the legislative bodies,  since 
SCAF also dissolute the Shura council later in 2013, hinder the progress of legislation reform 
which was demanded by EU. 
The introduction of the military as a stakeholder in EU democracy promotion policy was one 
of the major changes that happened after 2011. All key decisions were in the SCAF hands, thus 
meeting with military leaders was the new experience for the EU officials. This was not the case 
under Mubarak administration, as Mubarak or the minister of foreign relation handled those 
meetings. Only the EU army officials can meet local army officials.  Even during Morsi 
administration, the EU approach to advocate for change involved the military as one of the main 
actors.  During Morsi administration, The EU HR meets the Head of the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces, Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi to discuss recent political 
developments in Egypt and ensure the EU’s continued support to the democratic transition in the 
country (EEAS, 2012e). Including the military as one of the main actors in transition to 
democracy was a measurable change in the stakeholder structure of the EU foreign policy. 
The introduction of Islamic parties to Egypt-EU relation was another new phenomenon. 
People who were  banned from travel to EU or jailed for years, were among the main actors in 
policy during some time in the study period. This new actor has different ideology and 
understanding about democracy and human right, which affect the actions and argumentation of 
EU in promoting democracy as highlighted earlier. However, EU strategy, which will be 
described later under the issues section of this chapter, was to engage with them and not to repeat 
EU’s position after Hamas got in power in Gaza years ago. The EU strategy paper issued in 2012 
to amend the ENP titles “Delivering on a new European Neighborhood Policy”, noted 
“…Democratic transformation in a number of southern neighbors is bringing new political parties 
to the center of the political scene, in particular, but not exclusively, parties that have Islamic 
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roots. The EU needs, and is open to developing its dialogue with these parties as well as with all 
democratically elected governments.” 
Local political leaders from diverse political parties and moments were involved in EU 
consultation meetings and high-level delegation meeting in Cairo. Moreover, some of them were 
invited to travel to Brussels and other European cities to meet EU official there. During EU HR 
visit to Egypt in April 2013, Ashton met Morsi and leading opposition figures, including Amr 
Moussa, Mohamed El Baradei, Hamdeen Sabahy, Ahmed Said, Mohamed Abou el-Ghar and Said 
Badawi (EEAS, 2013). The involvement of local political and social leaders in the policy 
formulation process aimed to increase EU understanding to the local context, deepen EU 
engagements with the new political elites in order to be able to create policies that relevant to the 
new needs of the society. 
Youth movements, women groups and civil society organizations were involved in EU 
democracy promotion policy for the whole time of the study period. Defending activists, 
bloggers, and supporting women organizations was a continuous activities for EU across the four 
periods of the study. However, after 2011, the involvement of youth movements and women 
groups actors in the policy formulation process had increased (COM, 2012b, 2013b, 2014a). Both 
groups were constant attendees of all the EU consultation activities during the policy-planning 
phase. Moreover, representatives of youth movement were invited to travel to several EU capitals 
to speak with European governments about the future of Egypt-EU relations. EU strategy paper 
titled “European Neighborhood Policy” indicated that, “The EU intends to broaden this 
engagement, in particular through the engagement of civil society organizations in the preparation 
and monitoring of action plans or similar documents”.(COM, 2012a) 
Finally, the new unexpected actor in EU democracy promotion policy was the “Egyptian 
People”. It was new in EU discourse to use continuously the phrase “Egyptian people demands” 
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in the communication and a way to justify the need for democratization. Moreover, the 
demonstrations were the major channel that EU listen to in order to get the sentiment of the 
Egyptian street. However, Egyptian people were not physically present in EU policy formulation 
process but their actions influence the process and its outcome significantly.   
5.3. EU Policy process 
 
In addition to the changes introduced by Lisbon treaty to EU foreign policy process, which is 
not in the scope of this study, the changes that occurred to the policy process during the study 
period were in three main areas. First, the suspension of formal dialogue under ENP. Second, the 
taskforce meeting. Third, community consultation sessions (COM, 2011f, 2012b, 2013b).  
The formal ENP dialogue is performed between the Egyptian authorities and the EU in the 
framework of the Association committee4. A dialogue on human rights and democracy has been 
initiated in the context of sub-committees of the Association Committee and the European 
Neighborhood Policy Action Plans (COM, 2009). The Egypt-EU subcommittee on Political 
Matters, Human rights and democracy, international and regional issues met for the second time 
in July 2009 (COM, 2010), the progress report shows that the dialogue was constructive. 
After 2011 events, Formal dialogue under the ENP had been suspended since January 2011 
(COM, 2011f, 2012b). The process was hindered more by the termination of the Action plan, as 
its period was from 2007 to 2013 only. The events prevent an early start for negotiating a new 
Action plan that will start just after the end of this one. 
 
4 The association committee contains representatives from both sides organized in thematic 
subcommittees e.g. Industry, trade, services and investment; Transport, environment and energy; 
Information society and audiovisual, research and innovation, education and culture; Justice and security; 
Working group on migration, social and consular affairs (COM, 2008). The Association committee meeting 
discuss the Action plan progress and get each side to commit for actions in the coming period. This 
meeting is instrumental for planning and reporting both sides’ actions in the execution of the Action plan. 
The Association committee meet first in 2008, then meet continuously through 2009,2010 (COM, 2009, 
2010). 
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During Morsi era, formal dialogue was resumed in February 2013, through an Association 
committee meeting. At the meeting, it was agreed to extend the current Action Plan by one year, 
until March 2014. The Egyptian side committed to start exploratory talks on starting negotiations 
on a new Action Plan. It was also committed to arrange several subcommittee meetings. Both 
commitments were deferred due to the events leading to Morsi’s ousting on 3 July 2013 (COM, 
2014a). 
A new way of engagement was established by the creation of Egypt-EU taskforce, where 
Egypt and the EU can coordinate bilateral cooperation together (Huber, 2013). The taskforce 
contains representatives of both EU and Egypt from government, the EU’s Commission and 
External Action Service, the private sector, financial institutions (Balfour, 2012a). The task force 
was responsible for joint planning of the future EU actions in Egypt.  Egypt-EU task-force meet 
in November 2012 discussed an exceptionally wide range of issues including economic co-
operation, tourism, political reform, asset recovery, human rights, infrastructure, and science.  
Introduction of the taskforce in EU Egypt policy formulation process signals the high level of 
EU commitment and willing of engagement with Egypt, on the other hand it indicate that the 
actions are responsive to the requests coming from Egypt. As the meeting was delayed until 
Egypt would accept the new mechanism, also, the details of the taskforce process, especially the 
item of civil society inclusion, were subjected for modification according to the Egyptian 
authorities demands. This indicates that the EU policy in dependant on the demands of the 
Egyptian governments, thus a change in the Egyptian government preferences may cause a policy 
shift in the EU’s policy. This will be discussed in details in the causes of policy change section. 
Civil society consultations were introduced widely after 2011. The word “consultations” 
appear near the word “civil society” in the study data set only after 2011. ENP review process 
included consultations with the EU member states, ENP partner countries as well as local civil 
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society organizations and academics from the region (COM, 2011c). Consultations involving 
non-state actors was multi-layered and parallel to governments dialogue (COM, 2011a). 
Consultations with civil society even tackled the financial planning of the EU. SPRING program, 
will be described later in the instruments section, formulation process involved consultation with 
civil society. EEAS SPRING program action fiche report noted, “Consultations with civil society 
organizations, social partners and different community groups are envisaged as they are at the 
heart of a sustainable civil democratic modernization path "Spring"”  (COM, 2011b). The 
addition of civil society consultation mechanism in the EU policy formulation process was a 
measurable change in the policy process. It also affects the information input to the policy makers 
and hence it can affect the policy outputs. The detailed effect of the introduction of the civil 
society consultation mechanism will be to be further studied.  
5.4. Major policy issues 
 
Before 2011, it was assumed that political stability is the guard against challenges facing the 
EU from the region like security, terrorism, immigration, socio-economic gap (Balfour, 2012a). 
The EU democracy promotion policy, during Mubarak era, was operating on several dimensions. 
First, EU tries to emphasize the importance of the democratic procedures by focusing its 
diplomacy efforts to push for  free and fair elections as a starting point for establishing a 
democracy. The strategy was implemented by criticizing the conduct of elections, accusing it of 
irregularities, the presence of violence and loss of lives, low voters’ turnover, restricted access to 
polling stations for independent observers and candidates' representatives, media restrictions as 
well as arrests of opposition activists. Second, the EU tried to reform the political environment by 
pushing for the abolishment of the State of Emergency and advocating for basic human rights on 
every occasion. Third, the EU used ENP carrot policy to push for political reform by making 
economic assistance and support conditional on political reform. The EU documents during that 
period show soft remarks about political conditionality of cooperation with political reforms. The 
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conditionality was highlighted  in the theme of common values as a base of cooperation, but the 
EU toke no attempt to exercise that. Fourth, the EU supports civil society organizations to 
advocate for human rights and democratic practice. The support actions range from capacity 
building to financial grants. 
The EU  policy in Egypt, before 2011, was based on setting up normative frameworks for 
gradual economic and legislative adaptation. However, the EU policies did not attempt to 
challenge the nature of the political regime as it cooperated successfully with the EU (Balfour, 
2012a). The EU policy at that time was characterized by a dilemma between the EU’s stability 
and democratization goals (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010). Furthermore, there was a gap between the 
creation of initiatives and their implementation. The limited implementation was due to the 
delegation of political actions to individual countries’ bilateral relations, instead of applying 
coherent EU policies (Balfour, 2012a). This was the reason behind the reluctant EU position on 
the first days of the upraising (Bauer, 2013; Wouters & Duquet, 2013).  
2011 events offer the EU new opportunities for a major supportive role, by utilizing the 
procedures modernization dimension of the EU activities. The procedure modernization activities 
were used previously with the Eastern European countries to modernize the government 
procedures and build new institutions that function with democracy. This activities can serve as a 
catalyst for the formation of a post-authoritarian democratic regime (Bauer, 2013). This can help 
achieving the EU goals of supporting the development of a country specific notion of democracy.  
Soon after the first weeks of the 2011 events, the EU decidedly joined and supported the 
decision of the Egyptian people (Bauer, 2013; Wouters & Duquet, 2013). Van Rompuy, the 
president of the European Council at that time, stated the need for adapting the ENP (Bauer, 
2013). Consequently, the EU decided to rethink of a new set of relations with its Southern 
neighbors based on new principles, assumptions, and objectives (Balfour, 2012a; Wouters & 
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Duquet, 2013). Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy at that 
time, admits the EU wrong assumptions toward the Arab region, that authoritarian regimes were a 
guarantee of stability (Huber, 2013), and he highlights the  priority of democratic reform, good 
governance and human rights within the ENP in the coming period (Bauer, 2013).  
2011 events introduce new concerns to the EU regional policies. The events come together 
with the growth of faith-based political parties in the region. These highlight three major concerns 
(Balfour, 2012a): first, while practicing the EU non-partisan policy to develop deep democracy, 
can EU support faith-based political groups? If so, which groups? On what bases? Second, what 
if the electoral process bring to power a non EU cooperative party? Can EU endorse the result of 
the election ? Third, what if the new party democratically coming to power will have hostile 
policies against Israel? How can EU operate on that? These concerns were magnified by the fact 
that economic sanctions is not strong enough to change the position of governing parties (Balfour, 
2012a). Also, the new EU external energy policy which depend on the Arab region as a priority 
area in energy make the application of sanctions more problematic as it will affect the energy 
supply of the EU (Balfour, 2012a). 
5.5. Policy implementation instruments 
 
After few months of 2011 events, European Commission and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy undergo a review of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (Balfour, 2012a).  The review institute several changes in the implementation mechanisms 
of the EU policy toward Egypt. The main changes in the implementation mechanisms are: new 
way of engagement, new funding instruments, arms embargo and the application of restrictive 
measures. These new instruments of policy implementation were introduced alongside with 
strengthening of some old policies like controlling illegal immigration. 
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A new way of engagement was established by the creation of country specific task forces, 
where the EU and partner countries can coordinate aid together (Huber, 2013). The task force 
contain representatives of both EU and Egypt from government, the EU’s Commission and 
External Action Service, the private sector, financial institutions (Balfour, 2012a). The task force 
was applied to increase engagement with  Egypt. This signals that the level of EU engagement is 
responsive to the requests coming from each neighboring country.  
New tools were created to promote “deep democracy”. The ENP Review creates two new 
funding instruments, the Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED) with the aim to give civil society a stronger role in national and international politics 
(Balfour, 2012a), and encourage bottom-up initiatives which were served by the Instrument for 
Stability in the Mediterranean (Bauer, 2013). EED is an autonomous body capable of responding 
to funding requests more flexibly and rapidly than existing EU instruments. The new tool was 
planned to broaden EU reach to  civil society (Huber, 2013), by allowing the EU to support 
nonregistered NGOs, political movements and actors in a non-partisanship approach (Balfour, 
2012a). This represent a significant shift in EU policies, as for the first time Islamic parties and 
related civil society enjoyed EU support (Huber, 2013). However, the revised ENP did not refer 
to the EIDHR by restructuring according to the new political reality in the neighborhood, thus 
EIDHR continued to support projects and civil society in the same manner as prior to 2011 
(Wouters & Duquet, 2013). Currently, both EED and EIDHR are both operating in similar 
projects. 
On the security level, the EU applied its ‘restrictive measures’ policy and imposed sanctions 
on regimes and natural persons in Egypt (Wouters & Duquet, 2013). Restrictive measures aimed 
to restore international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework (CFSP) while maintaining respect for 
71 
 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. The measures used to freeze 
assets of some key persons in the old regime.  
The polices of illegal immigration and counterterrorism have gained more attention after 
Arab spring as the former polices were criticized to be anti-democratic by several NGOs. 
Moreover, The EU applied arms embargo on several Arab countries including Egypt during some 
periods in transition (Wouters & Duquet, 2013).  
5.6. Policy outcome 
 
The changes in the policy context, actors and process were reflected in the policy outcome. to 
deal with the new development in the Egyptian context, the EU used diverse political activities 
ranging from humanitarian assistance, the revision of long-term programs, sanctioning measures, 
and asset freeze (Balfour, 2012a). Barroso, the president of the European Commission at that 
time, and Ashton, European Commission High Representative, introduced a three-fold response 
of the EU to the developments in 2011, emphasizing ‘deep democracy’, economic development 
and renewed people-to-people contacts, with the aim of ‘sustainable stability’ as the new central 
idea on Mediterranean Neighborhood policies (Bauer, 2013), instead of the former short-termism 
(Wouters & Duquet, 2013). 
The new policies were built on four aspects: refined conditionality, greater differentiation 
according to local needs, new tools to support democracy-building, a stronger focus on 
sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development and strong partnership with people 
(Balfour, 2012a; Bauer, 2013). The “More for More” concept was established, starting from the 
SCAF era, offering the three Ms, More Money, More Market access and More Mobility, as 
variable incentives positively conditioned by democratic commitments from the new regime. 
(Balfour, 2012a; Bauer, 2013; Huber, 2013), which entail “less for less” to reduce benefits when 
democratic expectations are not met (Wouters & Duquet, 2013). The concept of More for More 
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was criticized by limited implementation. The criticism is disused later in the analysis. The EU 
also, started to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas5 (DCFTAs) and mobility 
partnerships with Egypt (Huber, 2013). The new policies also contain the EU security concerns, 
as the management of migration flows and border security was included side by side with the 
democracy partnership (Wouters & Duquet, 2013).  
However, ENP originally has the concepts of both conditionality and differentiation, the 
revised ENP reinforce those concepts and advocate for mutual accountability between EU and 
Egypt, which signal more commitment from the  EU to stick to its principles and promises in 
delivering incentives (Balfour, 2012a). This was clear in the amount of financial assistance 
located, through the SPRING program (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) 
launched September 2011 with 350 million Euro as a starting budget (Wouters & Duquet, 2013). 
Egypt enjoyed the services of the SPRING program, where 419 million Euro was allocated to 
Egypt during years 2011-2013 (Balfour, 2012a). 
6. EU’s policy changes causes  
 
Several causes contribute to the EU policy change during the study period. The causes range 
from; the shift in local context, the threat of being counterproductive, the opportunity of having 
local ownership for democratization, the change of the Egyptian government position toward 
democracy promotion activities, the fast development of the events and the unclear expectations. 
Those causes contribute together to push for the policy change.  
 
5 The DCFTAs consist of two parts: tariff reduction (built on WTO commitments) and adoption of EU trade 
acquis, going beyond tariff reductions to cover more extensively the dimensions of investment protection, 
public procurement, and competition policy. They cover all trade-related areas (including services, 
intellectual property rights, customs, public procurement, energy-related issues, competition, etc.), also 
tackling beyond the border obstacles through regulatory approximation with the trade-related EU acquis. 
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It is clear that the change in the local situation in Egypt was the main reason behind EU 
democracy promotion policy change. After 2011 events, EU recognizes the change in the local 
situation in Egypt and the need to change EU policies to cope with the new realities. EU official 
stated in one of the interviews that “on 11th of February, I throw my 2011-year plan in the trash; it 
was not valid any more”. In the European Commission press release issued on   22nd of December 
2011, the need to react to new and emerging priorities was clearly stated (COM, 2011g). On the 
same matter, Ashton referring to the events in the region she stated,”…[they] require us to look a 
fresh at the EU’s relationship with our neighbors...”(COM, 2011d). The EU is aware of the 
influence of the local events on its own interests. ENP strategy papers noted that “transformation 
process will have lasting consequences not only for the people and countries of the region but 
also for the rest of the world and the EU…” (COM, 2011e). 
The change in the local context presented threats and opportunities to the EU, in the same 
time. One of the threats was that the current policy is not valid anymore, as stated by an EU 
official, and had achieved only limited results (COM, 2011d). Another threat that undermine the 
effectively of the EU policy was that promotion of democracy under an authoritarian ruling is 
different from a regime in transition. EU official stated, “The old policy may be 
counterproductive and not that compatible with the current situation.” Other threat was the 
possibility of weakening the engagement with the new formed Egyptian governments. EU 
strategy paper titled “European Neighborhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership” 
noted that “Shifts in the foreign policy orientation of partner countries and the increasing 
involvement of other actors in the region may also make the EU less attractive as a model and 
partner.”(COM, 2013a). Those threats acted as catalysts to push for EU policy change. 
 Alongside with those threats, the major opportunity was that the current context added local 
ownership to democracy promotion. The local acceptance and support for democracy were in 
place in both Egyptian government and society. From the Egyptian government side, due to the 
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multiple changes in government, their priorities, and their ideologies, Egyptian government 
position toward international democracy promotion activities changed. After 2011, the change of 
the Egyptian government position toward the activities of international democracy promotion was 
a great opportunity for EU to implement new policies, as government was open to accept election 
observation and democracy related discussions and actions for the sake of their international 
legitimacy. Mubarak Government seemed increasingly convinced of the need to tackle 
governance issues as part of its domestic reform agenda (COM, 2010). That limited the space to 
discuss democratization and human rights related issues (COM, 2012b), as Mubarak regime 
considered it as an internal affair and limited to internal actors according to state sovereignty 
principles. For example, EU election monitoring was rejected by Mubarak and SCAF while it was 
endorsed by, Morsi and after Morsi administrations, as both were seeking international legitimacy 
for the newly formed regimes. The EU seized this opportunity and launched the largest election 
observation mission to Egypt in 2014 presidential election. 
Thus, the EU policy appears to be dependent on the Egyptian government choices. The 
analysis of reform results shows that the ENP works when the willingness to reform is present 
and society plays an active part in the process (COM, 2014b). The EU policy dependency on 
Egyptian government choices was clearly stated in an EU strategy paper. The paper noted, 
“Developments in 2013 — both positive and negative — underlined that the success of the policy 
is directly dependent on the ability and commitment of governments to reform and to deepen 
relations with the EU, as well as on the capacity to explain and gain popular support and 
adherence to this agenda” (COM, 2014b).  
Another clear example of the EU policy dependency on Egyptian government choices was 
indicated by the need of EU to hold the assistance package to Egypt until the Egyptian 
government requests it. EU strategy paper noted, “For Egypt, it would be premature to announce 
a support package until the authorities are ready to make a request for assistance and define 
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priority needs.”(COM, 2011e). The dependency on Egyptian government is embedded in EU 
policy process through the “Joint ownership” character of the Action Plan. This character 
indicates that the ENP Action Plan, as an operational tool of the policy, is fully negotiated and 
mutually agreed at political level from both Egyptian and the EU sides. It is not an imposition by 
either side, but an agreed agenda for common work (COM, 2006). 
In addition to the dependency on the Egyptian government choices, the limitation of Egyptian 
government’s mandate plays an important role in shaping EU policy. The limited mandates of the 
consecutive governments during the study period limited the ability of EU to discuss certain 
policy issues like mobility partnership and a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
(COM, 2012b). This forces EU to change its policy to cope with the limited mandate of the 
Egyptian governments. 
Furthermore, the EU policy is dependent on the active participation of the society in the 
democratization process(COM, 2014b). The Egyptian society in the study period demonstrates a 
huge shift in public participation. The increased level of participation represent an opportunity for 
EU to implement a new type of policies that extend the engagement of EU to the Egyptian 
society, which seems ready and eager for the adoption of the common values, mainly democracy. 
The fast development of the events and the unclear expectations about the progress in the 
local context pushed EU for multiple policy changes. It was noted in EU strategy paper that 
“…[EU] will increasingly need to differentiate its policy response, in line with the different 
developments, ambitions and needs ...” (COM, 2013a). The influence of the multiple changes on 
the policy was recognized on the implementation of ENP during 2013. ENP 2013 implementation 
report noted that “…[ENP] implementation in 2013 has, however, been greatly influenced by the 
continuously momentous political developments in the Southern Mediterranean.” (COM, 2014b).  
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The unclear expectations about the future of the transition process forced EU to adopt a more 
fixable form of engagement with Egypt.  ENP policy review noted, “…a need for greater 
flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs 
– whether they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and 
democratic consolidation.” (COM, 2011d). This indicates that the speed of the transition is 
critical to determine the proper EU intervention. 
7. Policy change mechanism  
 
The policy change mechanism can be illustrated in five steps: 
1. Recognize and define the local needs 
2. Gathering the necessary information 
3. Policy review  
4. Strategy paper development  
5. Integration of the new strategy in the implementation instruments  
The EU’s recognition of its need to be responsive to the local Egyptian situation and needs 
was the first step in the policy change mechanism. The EU’s need to be responsive operates to 
reshape the policy to cater to the new situation. The EU’s need to be responsive was highlighted 
in multiple EU’s documents. EU’s strategy paper noted that, “both EU and Member States need 
to ensure that the policy remains attractive and responds to the needs of their partners” (COM, 
2014b). In the same paper the policy differentiations according to partners’ needs was indicated, 
as the paper noted “The EU remains committed to building partnerships with each of its 
neighbors that reflect their individual needs, capacity and reform objectives” (COM, 2014b).  The 
need to be responsive was stated clearly in the ENP policy review strategy paper titled, “A New 
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Response to a Changing Neighborhood”, the paper stated, “The EU needs to rise to the historical 
challenges in our neighborhood.” 
The attempt to gather information was the second step in the mechanism of the EU policy 
change. EU strategy paper noted, “Understanding and respecting the pace of each society's own 
reforms process is fundamental. It requires constant dialogue, careful attention, and close 
monitoring by the EU” (COM, 2011d). In the EU’s attempt to understand the reality, EU 
demanded more information from its delegations, officials, analysts, and local partners. For the 
fulfillment of the same demand EU increased officials’ visits to Egypt and extend invitations for 
Egyptian government officials and local leaders to visit the EU and its local delegation for 
consultation meetings. Moreover, the EU appointed two new special representatives, one for Arab 
spring and one for human rights. All those activities beside the annual progress reports and the 
European Court of Auditors reports present a huge input in the policy formulation process that 
contribute to the policy change. 
The policy review was the third step in the policy change mechanism. EU performed a policy 
review for ENP in summer 2010 and continued until after 2011 events. The review of the ENP 
has led to a large debate among all EU institutions and a broad consensus on the need for stronger 
engagement (COM, 2012a). The policy review resulted in the development of new strategy 
papers, which can be considered the fourth step in the policy change mechanism.  
The integration into the cooperation framework in the form of association committee and 
subcommittee meeting, EU delegation plans, and other implementation instruments plans, is 
considered the fifth step in the policy change mechanism. The new strategy papers together with 
the annual progress reports, which review the Egyptian progress in implementing the Action Plan, 
were integrated into the existing institutional cooperation framework with the Egyptian 
government. The Action plan was designed from the beginning to be flexible to host such 
78 
 
changes (COM, 2004). The Action plan design included the procedures of reporting. Such 
reporting includes a “mid-term” policy review report is to be prepared by the Commission and the 
HR (High Representative), within two years of the approval of the Action plan and a further 
report within three years (COM, 2004). Those reports are of great value, as they can serve as a 
basis for the Council to decide the next step in contractual links with each partner country. 
However, the Action plan itself is not detailed for democracy promotion activities, the ability to 
change the action plan make it possible to add other items during the periodical reviews. During 
2011 reviewing process, democracy was added as a mainstream concept in the cooperation 
between Egypt and the EU.    
8. Criticism of the policy change  
 
The EU assumptions toward the Arab region, as a whole has shifted, from ‘Arabs do not do 
democracy’ to ‘time has come for Arab democracy’ which was considered by some scholars as a 
superficial shift (Alessandri & Altunişik, 2013b). This superficial shift in the assumption may 
result in a risk of putting diverse countries and processes into the same box, while they may be 
undergoing a diverse paths to diverse post authoritarianism regimes (Huber, 2013). That risk 
limits the ability of EU to effectively engage with each uprising and support it to fulfill its 
potential. In addition to that risk, EU perceived Arab spring through its understanding of western 
democracy which may hinder the ability of EU to support Arab countries to realize their own 
understanding of democracy (Huber, 2013). 
The effect of EU policy was limited. After Egypt-EU Action plan, several positive steps were 
taken by Mubarak regime to move forward with the political reform, like 2007 constitutional 
amendments. While the amendments opened more space for political participation and safeguard 
human rights, the practical results of subsequent elections and the continuous violations of human 
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rights raised concerns on the real situation of democracy in this period. Such violations 
questioned the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion policy during Mubarak era.   
The EU new policies, introduced after 2011 events, were practically implemented (Balfour, 
2012a). “More money” concept was hindered by the failure to commit more resources from 
member states due to the financial crisis (Huber, 2013). Having recourse to the international 
financial institutions only, like the European Building and Construction Bank (EBCB) (Balfour, 
2012a)  was not sufficient to cover the amount of money required for successful intervention. 
Furthermore, the direct assistance for democracy was relatively low, not exceeding 10% of the 
aid budget (Huber, 2013). “More market access” concept was hindered by the failure to break 
down the European trade protectionism and remove obstacles to free trade with the neighboring 
countries (Balfour, 2012a). “More mobility” concept was hindered by the disarray among some 
EU member states due to few mobility options that was proposed to Tunisia, that even bring up 
the possibility of a breakdown in the Schengen’s system solidarity mechanisms (Balfour, 2012a). 
Political conditionality concept was hindered, as always, from the EU’s sided by problems of 
double standards, credibility, impact, and differential treatment of partners. Balfour added other 
problems that hinder the effect of conditionality (Balfour, 2012a). Those problems can be seen 
from the neighboring countries ‘governments side, where some of the neighboring countries’ 
governments refuse the concept of conditionality, as it undermines their national identity and 
sovereignty (Balfour, 2012a). Moreover, as neighboring countries’ government become more 
democratic, they are more assertive toward refusal of conditionality and external interference in 
their local affairs (Balfour, 2012a). Also, the conditionality concept was weakened more by the 
silent diplomatic attitude for the European officials on human rights violations and violent actions 
of the transition governments in neighboring countries, such diplomatic attitude was used in a 
pragmatic way to voice a pro-Arab spring political position (Balfour, 2012a).  
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The weak conditionality concept highlight the inability of the EU to put forward conditions of 
leverage, attractions, incentives and relevance to be able to perform effective conditionality in a 
proactive way, rather than the reactive attitude which was exercised toward Arab spring countries 
(Balfour, 2012a). This situation demands that EU must redefine its conditionality policies with 
ethical bases for engagement, away from the traditional contradictions in supporting dictators and 
advocating for human rights in the same time.  
9. Conclusion  
 
Egypt is an important partner to the EU.  Egypt contributes to the EU’s energy security as a 
transit pathway of energy resources. Egypt contributes to Middle Eastern and Mediterranean 
stability and security as a military active partner in the EU’s Common Security and Foreign 
Policy framework (CSFP). Cooperation between Egypt and the EU is beneficial for both parties 
in the fields of combating terror, controlling illegal immigration, international trade, and global 
affairs.  
The EU faces several challenges that forced the restructuring of its foreign policy in the 
neighborhood. The challenges are immigration issues, Islamic extremism, energy security, 
regional security, and international trade. The EU endorses a democracy promotion policy as a 
way to deal with those challenges by establishing neighboring governments that share EU’s 
common values, which facilitate the cooperation between the EU and those governments and 
increase the chance for socio-economic development in those countries. Increases cooperation 
and socio-economic development in the neighboring countries is believed by the EU to facilitate 
integration and create a peaceful EU neighborhood. 
The EU democracy promotion policy in Egypt was rooted in the Association Agreement 
between Egypt and the EU. Democracy as a condition of Egypt-EU relation was not clearly 
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explicit in the agreement text. However, the idea was highlighted in the concept of common 
values as the base of cooperation. Later, common values used to refer to democracy especially the 
liberal form of democracy, which include fundamental freedoms and the respect of human rights. 
Following 2011 events, the EU democracy promotion policy in Egypt had changed. The 
analytical model studied above highlighted changes in context, actors, process, issues, 
instruments, and outcome. The Egyptian context was shifted from a country under an 
authoritarian ruler to a country in transition, and then shifted to a military intervention case. Later, 
it was shifted again to a transition to democracy. The analysis highlighted that new actors were 
introduced on both the Egyptian and the EU sides. Moreover, the policy process was developed, 
as it had included some new procedures like consultation with the local non-state actors. The 
policy issues changed to become much more explicitly focused on democracy, not only human 
rights like the period before 2011 events. New policy instruments were added like the task force 
and the European Endowment for Democracy. Due to time proximity, the policy outcome needs 
to be further studied later, currently, the main changes in the policy outcome are more 
engagement and unambiguous demand for democratization from the EU’s side. Nevertheless, the 
policy is currently criticized by low levels of implementation due to limited financial recourses 
available to the EU, contradiction with the EU's trade protectionism policy and anti-immigration 
sentiment in some member states. 
The analysis indicated that the change in the local situation in Egypt was the main reason 
behind EU democracy promotion policy change. That is because; promotion of democracy under 
an authoritarian ruling is different from in the same activity during transition. The change in the 
local context presented threats and opportunities, which forced the EU to undergo policy changes.  
The policy change mechanism can be explained by Cybernetics, where local feedback from 
the policy implementation team and other reviewers contribute as an input for a change in the 
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policy. The policy change mechanism can be illustrated in five steps: 1) Recognize and define the 
local needs, 2) Gathering the necessary information, 3) Policy review, 4) Strategy paper 
development, 5) Integration of the new strategy in the implementation instruments. 
Finally, the study concluded that there were no major changes in the EU policies but what 
happened were only some corrections in the current strategy.  Further research should be 
conducted to investigate the policy outcomes and results of those corrections. 
10. Recommendations  
 
The study proposes the following recommendations as a way forward to develop a much 
more effective EU democracy promotion policy: 
• More information about the local culture is needed to design an effective policy that 
can engage with the society 
• The democracy promotion policy scope must be adjusted to cater to the local 
population needs of economic and social rights, and it must not only focus on the 
civic right and democratization procedures to be able to connect with local actors. 
• Stronger engagement is needed with the Egyptian government to build a valuable 
leverage in order to be able to push for democratic reforms.  
• Stronger engagement with other stakeholders like civil society, political party and 
parliamentary organizations is needed to bring consensus on democratic reforms 
• The policy must endorse that the target societies might aim at diverse models of 
democracy other than the models operating at the EU 
• The policy must focus on people-to-people relation by boosting bilateral and 
multilateral platforms for exchange for people, ideas, goods, and services between 
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Egypt and EU. This will help internalization of common values and it will lead to 
local ownership of the need for democratization. 
• The policy must work to frame common understanding and respect of values 
especially human rights. The EU’s violation of human rights must be treated like the 
Egyptian one. This can build the spirit of equal partnership and boost the credibility 
of the EU when pushing for democratic reforms.  
• The policy must reorganize the multiple interconnected funding instruments and 
regulations, with the application of consistent precise conditionality.   
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